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Chemtrails and Solar Geoengineers: 
Governing Online Conspiracy Theory 
Misinformation 
Charles R. Corbett* 
ABSTRACT 
As greenhouse gases mount, interest in unorthodox proposals to limit 
warming temperatures has grown.  Solar geoengineering is one idea: 
interventions in the atmosphere that would cool the Earth by reflecting away 
a small percentage of incoming sunlight.  Inspired by global cooling observed 
after volcanic eruptions, it seems solar geoengineering could be technically 
quick and simple to implement, but rather imperfect as climate policy.   
Public consideration of the technology, however, is blighted by a surreal 
problem: the online popularity of baseless “chemtrail” conspiracy theories.  
Chemtrailers claim covert solar geoengineering programs are already 
underway and polluting the environment with toxic pollutants, as evidenced 
by aircraft contrails in the sky.  The theory is completely false.  But belief is 
surprisingly widespread, enabled by content dissemination practices of social 
media companies and strong legal protections for online speech. 
This Article assesses legal obstacles to regulating chemtrail 
misinformation and proposes responses that work within prevailing norms 
and laws governing online speech.  It explains how chemtrail content 
complicates public deliberation on solar geoengineering and, by extension, 
hurts the legitimacy of research activities.  It also sharpens the general 
contributions of misinformation scholarship by applying them specifically to 
chemtrail content.  It concludes with recommendations on how to limit 
chemtrail misinformation’s spread and impact.  Reckoning with climate 
change, geoengineering, and online misinformation is a multigenerational 
 
*Emmett Climate Engineering Fellow in Environmental Law and Policy, Emmett 
Institute, UCLA School of Law. Many thanks to Ted Parson and Michelle Melton 
for comments, and to the Missouri Law Review editorial board for thoughtful 
review and recommendations 
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project.  Legal and policy analysis must accordingly adopt a long-time 
horizon when devising regulatory responses. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Solar geoengineering describes a set of proposed technologies that 
would limit the harms of climate change by altering Earth’s flows of incoming 
and outgoing solar energy.1  Of these proposals, stratospheric aerosol injection 
is the most researched and widely discussed, though many basic technical 
questions remain unexplored.2  A stratospheric aerosol injection program 
would spray a reflective aerosol high above in the atmosphere, perhaps using 
aircraft or balloons.3  While the dispersed aerosol droplets remain suspended 
in the stratosphere, they would reflect a small portion of incoming sunlight 
back out into space, producing a cooling effect across the planet.4  
Stratospheric aerosol injection takes inspiration from episodes of global 
cooling observed after volcanic eruptions, especially the 1991 eruption of 
Mount Pinatubo.5  That scientists have observed such cooling in the past is 
one of the reasons some are so confident that stratospheric aerosol injection 
could work as promised.  But much scientific research would be needed for 
decision makers to reach an informed decision on whether to develop, let 
alone deploy, the technology.  
The most challenging problems posed by solar geoengineering are not 
technical or scientific, but rather “social, ethical, legal and political.”6  Over 
the last fifteen years or so, a new area of academic literature, “geoengineering 
 
 1. Eli Kintisch, CLIMATE ENGINEERING AND THE LAW: REGULATION AND 
LIABILITY FOR SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT AND CARBON DIOXIDE 
REMOVAL 28 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy Hester eds., 2018).  These proposals 
are also referred to as “geoengineering” or “climate engineering” technologies. 
 2. Douglas G. MacMartin et al., Geoengineering with Stratospheric 
Aerosols: What Do We Not Know After a Decade of Research?, 4 EARTH’S 
FUTURE 543, 543 (Nov. 2016). 
 3. An aerosol is simply a number of particles or droplets of liquid suspended 
in a gas.    Kintisch, supra note 1, at 29–30.  
 4. Id. 
 5. See David W. Keith, Photophoretic Levitation of Engineering Aerosols 
for Geoengineering, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16,428, 16,428 (2010) 
(discussing environmental impacts of sulfur aerosols released by Mount 
Pinatubo).  
 6. ROYAL SOC’Y, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE, 
AND UNCERTAINTY xi (Sept. 2009); see also id. at x (“[T]he large-scale adoption 
of Solar Radiation Management methods would create an artificial, approximate, 
and potentially delicate balance between increased greenhouse gas concentrations 
and reduced solar radiation, which would have to be maintained, potentially for 
many centuries.  It is doubtful that such a balance would really be sustainable for 
such long periods of time, particularly if emissions of greenhouse gases were 
allowed to continue or even increase.”). 
5
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governance,” has sprung up to identify and begin answering these questions.7  
A topline finding of the governance literature concerns public engagement 
and communications.  In short, building an informed public discourse on 
geoengineering is fundamental to the legitimacy of research and of potential 
development.8  Without informed public deliberation, there can be no genuine 
democratic processes to guide oversight and decision-making.9  
Solar geoengineering researchers, however, face a surreal challenge 
when it comes to building an informed public discourse: the popularity of 
chemtrail conspiracy theories online.  Chemtrail conspiracy theorists claim 
that contrails, the plumes of water vapor condensation left behind by aircraft 
engines (the “trails”), are not made of water vapor at all, but rather poisonous 
chemicals or covert geoengineering agents (the “chems”).10  The claims of 
these “chemtrailers” have been debunked by scientists,11 public-facing fact-
checking organizations,12 and at least one court,13 but belief in the conspiracy 
 
 7. Janos Pasztor, The Need for Governance of Climate Geoengineering, 31 
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 419, 425 (2017) (stating a 2006 article by Nobel laureate 
Paul J. Crutzen’s “broke that taboo” on research of “geoengineering techniques”). 
 8. See OXFORD GEOENGINEERING PROGRAMME, Oxford Principles: The 
Principles, 
http://www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk/www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk/oxford-
principles/principles/index.html [https://perma.cc/5S9B-NKB2] (last visited July 
19, 2020) (Principle 2, discussing the need to “notify, consult, and ideally obtain 
the prior informed consent of[] those affected by research activities”).  
 9. See Marion Hourdequin, Climate Change, Climate Engineering, and the 
‘Global Poor’: What Does Justice Require?, 21 ETHICS, POL’Y & ENV’T 270, 273 
(2018) (proposing a “trivalent” model of justice for geoengineering including 
“distributive, participatory, and recognitive dimensions” of justice); see also 
Marion Hourdequin, Geoengineering Justice: The Role of Recognition, 44 SCI., 
TECH. & HUM. VALUES 448, 450–53 (2019) (elaborating on recognition justice 
and participatory parity); and David E. Winickoff, Jane A. Flegal & Asfawossen 
Asrat, Engaging the Global South on Climate Engineering Research, 5 NATURE 
CLIMATE CHANGE 627, 627 (2015).  
 10. E.g., GEOENGINEERING WATCH, Geoengineering Introduction Letter, 
https://www.geoengineeringwatch.org/geoengineering-introduction-letter/ 
[https://perma.cc/JB9Q-KB7J] (last visited July 19, 2020).  
 11. Christine Shearer et al., Quantifying Expert Consensus Against the 
Existence of a Secret, Large-Scale Atmospheric Spraying Program, 11 ENVTL. 
RES. LETTERS no. 084011 8 (2016).  
 12. E.g., Kim LaCapria, NASA Lithium Chemtrails Conspiracy, SNOPES 
(Apr. 21, 2016) (concluding reports by conspiracy theory websites that “NASA 
admitted to dosing Americans with airborne lithium” were false).  A “false” rating 
by Snopes “indicates that the primary elements of a claim are demonstrably false.” 
SNOPES, Fact Check Ratings, https://www.snopes.com/fact-check-ratings/ 
[https://perma.cc/N3CZ-S8TC] (last visited July 19, 2020).  
 13. Pelletier v. Her Majesty the Queen, [2018] F.C. 805, paras. 17–18 (Can.) 
(evidentiary ruling in a class action alleging chemtrail spraying operations by the 
Canadian government, in which the court refused to admit plaintiff’s expert 
6
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theory has persisted and spread.14  Online conspiracy theory networks 
dedicated to researching and promoting chemtrail conspiracy theories have 
been successful at promoting their worldview on social media, attracting 
followers, and crowding out legitimate coverage of geoengineering 
technologies.15  Their success comes from a deliberate communications 
strategy,16 frequent and enthusiastic publication of their ideas,17 gullible 
groups,18 and the engagement-maximizing design of social media’s content-
promotion algorithms.19  
 
affidavit because of its “categorial,” “unqualified” analysis that “effectively draws 
conclusions about the chemical makeup of contrails based on a simple review of 
photographs”).  
 14. See Ashley M. Mercer et al., Public Understanding of Solar Radiation 
Management, 6 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS no. 044006 8 (2011) (presenting a survey 
of 3,105 people in the United States, Canada, and United Kingdom, finding that 
2.6% respondents believe the chemtrail conspiracy theory “completely true,” and 
14% believe it to be “partly true”); and Dustin Tingley & Gernot Wagner, Solar 
Geoengineering and the Chemtrails Conspiracy on Social Media, 3 PALGRAVE 
COMM. no. 12 1 (2017) (showing a poll of 1,000 Americans finding about 10% 
believed the chemtrail conspiracy theory to be “completely” true, and about 20 to 
30% believe it to be “somewhat” true).  
 15. Tingley & Wagner, supra note 14, at 1 (“Conspiratorial views have 
accounted for [about] 60% of geoengineering discourse on social media over the 
past decade.”); Joachim Allgaier, Science and Environmental Communication on 
YouTube: Strategically Distorted Communications in Online Videos on Climate 
Change and Climate Engineering, 4 FRONTIERS COMM. no. 36 1 (2019) 
(reviewing 200 videos on YouTube, retrieved using climate change and 
geoengineering search terms, finding a majority “support worldviews that are 
opposing scientific consensus, with 91 . . . propagat[ing] straightforward 
conspiracy theories about climate engineering and climate change”).  
 16. E.g., GEOENGINEERING WATCH, How to Get Involved; Approaching 
People on the Topic of Geoengineering, 
https://www.geoengineeringwatch.org/how-to-get-involved/ 
[https://perma.cc/8EDP-BPUS] (last viewed July 19, 2020) (“First of all, 
semantics are extremely important in regard to the introduction of geoengineering. 
The geoengineering term is related to hard science, the ‘chemtrails’ term has no 
such verifiable basis but rather leads anyone that Googles the term straight to 
‘conspiracy theory’ and ‘hoax’ definitions. Use the terms ‘climate engineering’ 
and ‘geoengineering.’”).  
 17. Allgaier, supra note 15, at 2.   
 18. See Gordon Pennycook & David G. Rand, Who Falls for Fake News? The 
Roles of Bullshit Receptivity, Overclaiming, Familiarity, and Analytic Thinking, 
88 J. PERSONALITY 185, 186 (Apr. 2020) (arguing gullibility among some 
information consumers as a key driver of the uptake of patently false factual 
claims).   
 19. See Michela Del Vicario et al., The Spread of Misinformation Online, 113 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 554, 554 (2016) (attributing information cascades on 
Facebook to the homogeneity of online communities, so-called “echo chambers,” 
7
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There is a striking, if superficial, resemblance between solar 
geoengineering proposals for stratospheric aerosol injections and chemtrail 
conspiracy theories.20  Both imagine aerial spraying of potent chemicals, far 
above in the atmosphere, carried out by powerful, mysterious state actors to 
bring about observable effects on the surface.  Many popular forms of the 
chemtrail conspiracy theory resemble factually accurate coverage of 
stratospheric aerosol injections and geoengineering, with the key difference – 
and misrepresentation – being that the conspiracy theorists allege the 
“spraying” is already underway.21  This affinity between geoengineering 
conspiracy and reality is due in part to the intellectual histories of the ideas.  
The chemtrail conspiracy theory was formulated by environmental journalist 
William Thomas, who drew on a speculative U.S. Air Force research paper 
called Weather as a Force Multiplier: Owning the Weather in 2025,22 as well 
as a 1991 patent describing a solar geoengineering-like technology,23 to argue 
that the U.S. government was carrying out a covert geoengineering program 
to fight global warming.24  Thomas’s ideas were popularized by nationally-
syndicated talk-show host Art Bell, who had Thomas on his show Coast to 
Coast several times in the late 1990s and early 2000s to discuss chemtrails.25  
 
and group polarization); and Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, 
Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1667 
(2018) (arguing that engagement optimization on social media leads to less 
exposure among media consumers to diverse viewpoints).  
 20. See generally Rose Cairns, Climates of Suspicion: ‘Chemtrail’ 
Conspiracy Narratives and the International Politics of Geoengineering, 182 
GEOGRAPHICAL J. 70 (2016) (arguing thematic overlap between geoengineering 
criticism and the chemtrail conspiracy theory has strongly linked the two ideas for 
the foreseeable future).  
 21. GEOENGINEERING WATCH, supra note 10.  
 22. COL. TAMZY J. HOUSE ET AL. vi (Aug. 1996) (“[W]eather-modification 
offers the war fighter a wider-range of possible options to defeat or coerce an 
adversary . . .  [f]rom enhancing friendly operations or disrupting those of the 
enemy via small-scale tailoring of natural weather patterns to complete 
dominance of global communications and counterspace control.”). 
 23. Stratospheric Welsbach Seeding for Reduction of Global Warming, U.S. 
Patent No. 5,003,186 col. 1 ls. 45–68 (issued Mar. 26, 1991) (describing a process 
for spraying metallic oxides in the stratosphere to allow greater amounts of energy 
radiating from Earth’s surface to escape into space).  Mainstream stratospheric 
aerosol injection proposals differ from “Welsbach Seeding” in at least one 
important respect: they would seek to deflect away a portion of incoming solar 
energy.  See Kintisch, supra note 1, at 29.  
 24. WILLIAM THOMAS, CHEMTRAILS CONFIRMED 20, 65 (2010); see also 
Annalee Newitz & Adam Steiner, Here’s Where the Chemtrail Conspiracy 
Theory Actually Came From, GIZMODO (Sep. 24, 2014).  
 25. THOMAS, supra note 24, at 20; see also COAST TO COAST AM, William 
Thomas, https://www.coasttocoastam.com/guest/thomas-william/5796 (last 
updated Feb. 22, 2020) (listing Thomas’s appearances on the show over the last 
three decades).  
8
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Art Bell was well known for covering fringe conspiracy theories on his show, 
and a story by Time magazine in 1999 reported the chemtrail conspiracy 
theory was particularly popular among Bell’s audience.26 
A few years later, Nobel laureate Paul J. Crutzen penned an influential 
essay calling for serious scientific and academic examination of 
geoengineering technologies, including stratospheric aerosol injection.27  This 
piece has been widely credited as having “broke the taboo” on solar 
geoengineering within the climate policy world, launching the geoengineering 
governance literature that exists today.28  Suddenly, reputable academics were 
imagining scenarios reminiscent of those described by Thomas and other 
conspiracy-theory communities.  The two discourses, chemtrails and solar 
geoengineering governance, matured side by side.  Chemtrail theorists have 
closely monitored developments within the geoengineering world for clues 
into the supposed conspiracy.29  Occasionally, geoengineering researchers 
have responded with debunking content of their own.30 
The resemblance between chemtrail content and solar geoengineering 
can also be explained on a more abstract level.  The governance discourse on 
solar geoengineering technologies has uncovered concerns of legitimacy and 
trust: who will carry a solar geoengineering program out?  How can one be 
sure they will act for the good of the globe?  What will hold them 
accountable?31  A lack of trust, in turn, can create fertile ground for chemtrail 
conspiratorial ideation.32  Public discourse on solar geoengineering therefore 
may be indefinitely linked to online communities peddling chemtrail 
conspiracy theories, due to this problem of trust, perceived and actual 
degradation of local environments, and resentment of concentrated control by 
a small number of elites.33  
 
 26. Richard Corliss, The X Phones, TIME (Aug. 9, 1999).  
 27. Paul J. Crutzen, Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur Injections: 
A Contribution to Resolve a Policy Dilemma?, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 211, 217 
(2006). 
 28. Pasztor, supra note 7, at 425. 
 29. OLIVER MORTON, THE PLANET REMADE 104 (2015).  
 30. THE KEITH GROUP, HARV. U., Chemtrails Conspiracy Theory, 
https://keith.seas.harvard.edu/chemtrails-conspiracy-theory (last visited Mar. 6, 
2020).  
 31. See, e.g., Rose Cairns, supra note 20, at 79 (“With regard to the emerging 
international politics of geoengineering, the issue of trust . . . is likely to be 
perennially problematic.”).  
 32. See generally, e.g., Alexandra Bakalaki, Chemtrails, Crisis, and Loss in 
an Interconnected World, 12 VISUAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 12 (2016) (study of 
how chemtrail conspiracy theories seized the imagination of large parts the Greek 
public during the 2009 financial crises, arguing that distrust of European Union 
economic policy on Greek sovereign debt enabled the mass delusion).  
 33. Cairns, supra note 20, at 80.  Cairns persuasively argues that chemtrail 
conspiracy theory communities presage “the emerging politics of 
geoengineering.”  Id.  Cairns’s argument also lends support to the idea that the 
9
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A. A Call to Action on Chemtrail Misinformation  
We know that chemtrail conspiracy theories are relatively widespread, 
that they are often linked to solar geoengineering in popular sources of 
information, and that they are already clouding public perception on 
geoengineering.  These patterns can be expected to continue into the future 
due to the superficial resemblance between the conspiracy theory and solar 
geoengineering technology, as well as the chemtrail narrative’s ability to 
speak to feelings of distrust, disgust, and resentment toward solar 
geoengineering.  The conversation on geoengineering governance should 
therefore be expanded to include responses to chemtrail misinformation 
online.  
The problem of chemtrail misinformation is intertwined with the broader 
problem of misinformation on social media.  Many of the observations of how 
and why chemtrail conspiracy theories thrive online are equally applicable to 
flat-earthers, anti-vaxxers, or 9/11 truthers.34  Accordingly, academic 
assessments of online conspiracy theories and misinformation usually lump 
these conspiracy narratives together and consider legal and governance 
responses to them as a whole.35  This generalizing goes a little too far, 
however, in that it overlooks the ways that each strain of misinformation has 
a life and social reality of its own.  For example, antisemitic conspiracy 
theories advancing white nationalist political projects have different 
audiences, purposes, and impacts than science-skeptic conspiracies sowing 
 
conspiracy theory itself may endure, develop, and spread alongside development 
of genuine solar geoengineering programs.  
 34. Flat Earthers claim “the concept of a globe-shaped Earth is . . . the biggest 
conspiracy theory ever to exist.”  Matthew Cappucci, The weather helps disprove 
the flat-Earth hypothesis, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2020/02/24/weather-helps-disprove-
flat-earth-hypothesis/ [https://perma.cc/T3WU-7KLS] (reporting one Flat Earther 
“died in a rocket accident while trying to prove” the Earth was flat).  Anti-vaxxers 
advocate against vaccinating children against the measles, mumps, and rubella, 
arguing, contrary to medical science, that the vaccine causes autism.  See Peter J. 
Hotez, Texas and Its Measles Epidemics, 10 PLOS MED. 13, 1, 2–4 (Oct. 2016), 
https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002153 
[https://perma.cc/GD8D-ZFC8] (predicting lack of vaccinations will cause 
measles outbreaks in Texas as early as 2018); Sahotra Sarkar et al., Measles 
resurgence in the USA: how international travel compounds vaccine resistance, 
19 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 684, 685–86 (2019) (reporting a large spike of 
measles cases in Texas in 2019, attributing the outbreak partially to “low 
vaccination rates”).  The “9/11 Truth” movement baselessly argues the U.S. 
government had a hand in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  See Alan 
Feuer, 500 Conspiracy Buffs Meet to Seek the Truth of 9/11, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 5, 
2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/05/us/05conspiracy.html 
[https://perma.cc/2RM9-FRDU].  
 35. E.g., David S. Han, Conspiracy Theories and the Marketplace of Facts, 
16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 178, 180 (2017). 
10
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doubt about vaccination efficacy.  A state law mandating vaccinations and 
limiting the use of parental objections could respond to the fallout from anti-
vaxxer misinformation but would do nothing to respond to the harms of 
crypto-fascist propaganda.  To that end, this Article identifies a few 
governance responses that can directly target the solar geoengineering and 
chemtrail-conspiracy nexus. 
The most effective governance responses, however, will focus on 
structures that take advantage of the gullibility of information consumers.  The 
cause of online misinformation is not simply that the information consumers 
are inundated with is patently untrue.  The problem is better understood as 
arising from the proliferation of competing authorities on factual truth, at the 
expense of traditional knowledge-creating and knowledge-sharing 
institutions, leading to a bedlam of conflicting factual claims.36  Though 
technologically driven epistemic crises are a very old phenomena,37 the rise 
of the Internet, and particularly of dominant social media platforms and search 
engines, has magnified the problem.38  Information consumers are empowered 
like never before to find and choose which authorities and experts to trust, and 
those selected experts provide the factual predicates for the worldviews of 
those consumers.  That fact-finding process, in turn, is largely structured by 
social networks online, steered by the engagement-maximizing algorithms of 
social media platforms.39  
This paper focuses on governing social media platforms as a method for 
better managing misinformation because the platforms are the most 
governable link in the fact-finding chain.  While specifically censoring 
chemtrail misinformation would be ineffective, illegal, and morally wrong, it 
seems practically and ethically feasible to govern Facebook, Twitter, 
 
 36. See Peter Dahlgren, Media, Knowledge and Trust: The Deepening 
Epistemic Crisis of Democracy, 25 J. EUR. INST. COMM. & CULTURE 20, 23–24 
(2018).  The U.S. news aggregation site Real Clear Politics shows this dynamic 
well in American political news coverage, documenting the conflicting and 
divergent factual accounts of news providers online, following the ideological 
lens of the outlet and its readership.  The effect is jarring when the at-odds 
coverage is read together.  REAL CLEAR POLITICS, 
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/ [https://perma.cc/RB39-E8BN] (accessed 
July 21, 2020). 
 37. See, e.g., ALLAN K. JENKINS & PATRICK PRESTON, BIBLICAL 
SCHOLARSHIP AND THE CHURCH: A SIXTEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY 
xi (David Jasper et al. eds., 2016) (describing the Catholic Church’s challenges in 
limiting the spread of unauthorized translations of the Bible, “yield[ing] . . .  shock 
waves” of the Protestant Reformation). 
 38. Michela del Vicario et al., supra note 19, at 554.  
 39. See DAVID KAYE, SPEECH POLICE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE TO GOVERN 
THE INTERNET 15 (2019) (Compared to the blogosphere of the early popular 
internet, today’s “centralizing internet dominated by the corporate imperatives of 
advertising and data mining and the incentives of virality is . . . a much friendlier 
environment to ‘manufactured amplification.’”). 
11
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YouTube, and whatever other large social media platform that may arise.  But 
the most useful governance responses must also focus on the habits of 
information consumers themselves.  Governance of social media platforms 
can only limit users’ passive exposure to misinformation streams.  They can 
and should do less to limit access to information that people seek out for 
themselves or that a trusted source directly shares with them.  Public education 
efforts in information literacy could do much to make users more 
sophisticated and warier in their information consumption habits.  While 
improved information literacy would do little for state and institutional actors 
with their crisis of authority, it could help communities navigate informational 
landscapes for themselves.  Embracing democratic empowerment may be the 
best path out of the current epistemic panic.  
Part II gives an overview of chemtrails and a theoretical framework for 
considering governance, misinformation, and conspiracy theory content.  Part 
III argues for the need to govern misinformation, surveys the U.S. legal 
framework for regulating patently false statements of fact and online content-
sharing, and analyzes the ways which social media platforms – particularly 
Facebook – govern user content.  Part IV considers various governance 
methods for misinformation in general, and chemtrail misinformation in 
particular, largely informed by the substantial legal obstacles identified in Part 
III.  This Article concludes with a few proposals to avoid.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
Governing chemtrail misinformation requires a solid understanding of 
the conspiracy theory’s internal logic, social appeal, and prevalence.  After 
providing this background, this Part develops a theoretical framework for 
approaching the problem of misinformation governance in general and for 
chemtrail conspiracy content specifically.  It concludes by acknowledging the 
limits of proposals to govern politically charged misinformation.  
A.  A Chemtrails Primer 
1.  The Chemtrail Theory: Message and Medium 
Aircraft engines release exhaust during flight, and that exhaust contains 
water vapor, soot, small particles, and other pollutants like sulfur dioxide and 
carbon dioxide.40  In cold, high-altitude air, aerosols from aircraft exhaust can 
cause water vapor to condense into long, thread-like clouds.41  These clouds, 
“contrails” (short for “condensation trails”), were explained scientifically as 
 
 40. LANGLEY RES. CTR., NASA, The Contrail Education Project: Contrail 
Science https://science-edu.larc.nasa.gov/contrail-edu/science.html 
[https://perma.cc/W4XT-Q9T5] (last visited Mar. 6, 2020). 
 41. Ulrich Schumann, Formation, properties, and climatic effects of 
contrails, 6 COMPTES RENDUS PHYSIQUE 549, 550 (2005). 
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early as 1941.42  If the air is dry, contrails quickly evaporate and dissipate.43  
But if the air is humid enough, contrails can linger, sometimes causing the 
formation of wide expanses of cirrus clouds.44  These artificially-seeded 
clouds can pull moisture out of the atmosphere and reflect energy radiating 
from the planet’s surface back down to Earth.45  How much these dynamics 
can influence local weather and global climate is currently being studied.46  
Chemtrail conspiracy theorists falsely claim that many contrails are not 
benign plumes of condensed water vapor, but rather toxic chemicals 
deliberately sprayed by covert operatives, with calamitous effect to humans 
and the environment.47  The purpose of the spraying, the identity of the 
supposed conspirators, and the composition and effects of the chemicals all 
vary between conspiracy-theorist communities.48  Generally speaking, it is 
governments – real, imagined, or unknowable – that are named as the 
perpetrators.  The reality of the spraying is evidenced by concrete harms 
supposedly observable in the local environment, like elevated levels of 
environmental toxins, severe outbreaks of illness in humans and livestock, 
and, of course, the contrails themselves.49 
Seen from the ground, contrails can be striking, clear evidence of 
humanity’s impact on the natural world.  The visual appearance of these 
clouds can serve as a gateway into the chemtrail universe, given that they are 
so vast and often distinctly artificial.  William Thomas, the environmental 
journalist credited for originating the chemtrail theory in the late 1990s,50 
describes his personal awakening while watching a videotape of a contrail 
pattern, shared with him by an acquaintance:  
 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 553. 
 45. Id. at 557.  
 46. See Guy P. Brasseur et al., Impact of Aviation on Climate: FAA’s Aviation 
Climate Change Research Initiative (ACCRI) Phase II, 97 BULL. AM. 
METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 561, 562 (2016). 
 47. MORTON, supra note 29, at 102. 
 48. Id. at 103.  
 49. See, e.g., THOMAS, supra note 24, at 24–42 (2010) (reporting health 
outbreaks after contrail sightings); Dane Wigington, Geoengineering Creating 
Freeze Fry Extremes, GEOENGINEERING WATCH (Apr. 19, 2019), 
https://www.geoengineeringwatch.org/geoengineering-creating-freeze-fry-
extremes/ [https://perma.cc/M9VG-TMA3] (last visited June 1, 2020); and 
Global March Against Geoengineering, FACEBOOK,  
https://www.facebook.com/pg/GlobalMarchAgainstChemtrailsAndGeoengineeri
ng/about/?ref=page_internal [https://perma.cc/A96E-UURZ] (last visited June 1, 
2020). 
 50. William Thomas, “Contrails” Mystify, Sicken Americans, ENVTL. NEWS 
SERV. (Jan. 8, 1999).   
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Instead of dissipating like normal contrails, these cross-hatched 
plumes began to widen  and spread across the sky. As we watched over 
the next half-hour, the strange trails  blended together, turning a ‘blue 
sky’ day into a milky murky overcast . . . . [T]his  strange motif [was 
repeated] over a period of days.51 
“Look up and wake up” could be said to serve as the chemtrail 
movement’s motto.52  Chemtrail online content is highly visual.53  In the eyes 
of its theorists, the most persuasive pieces of evidence are the photographs 
that document these supposedly abnormal or “strange” contrails.  As Thomas 
explains in Chemtrails Confirmed:  
[This book] is a ‘for the record’ omnibus of eyewitness accounts, 
documented facts and  photographs weighty enough to be tossed like a 
brick through the nearest glass tower of  denial . . . . [P]ictures of 
outrageous ‘gridding’ and associated chemtrails phenomenon are 
 central to this story. Nearly 200 photographs punctuate the text, adding 
to this ebook’s  readability and credibility.54 
These pictures play a curious dual role among chemtrail theorists: a 
source of hope, because they are clear evidence of the conspiracy, but also a 
source of despair, because they signify bodily and environmental harm that 
 
 51. See THOMAS, supra note 24, at 12. 
 52. See, e.g., id.; GEOENGINEERING WATCH, Geoengineering—Look Up and 
Wake Up (May 19, 2015), 
https://www.geoengineeringwatch.org/geoengineering-look-up-and-wake-up/ 
[https://perma.cc/9QNY-GBKV] (last visited June 1, 2020). 
 53. See, e.g., Olivia Nuzzi, A Kardashian Stumbles Upon a Chemtrail, DAILY 
BEAST (last updated Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/a-
kardashian-stumbles-upon-a-chemtrail?ref=scroll [https://perma.cc/9QK6-
8DE9] (reporting Kylie Jenner shared a chemtrail meme to her nine million 
followers on Twitter, reading: “Why did I see 75 planes spraying white stuff into 
the sky on my 15 minute drive to work? . . . Am I the only one who sees this?”) 
(emphasis added); Chris Bell, ‘Chemtrail’ conspiracy theorists: The people who 
think governments control the weather, BBC NEWS (Jan. 31, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-42195511 [https://perma.cc/H7Y4-
S85N] (quoting one supporter of the chemtrail conspiracy as saying, “I ask that 
we move beyond the notion that this is a conspiracy theory. . . .  Twenty to thirty 
years ago we never saw these trails. We had a beautiful blue sky.”); Henry 
Fountain, Scientists Try to counter the stubborn ‘chemtrail’ conspiracy theory, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Aug. 16, 2016) (“As evidence, they point to what they 
call ‘chemtrails,’ which are more commonly known as contrails, or condensation 
trails, produced at high altitudes as water vapor in jet engine exhaust condenses 
and freezes.”).  
 54. THOMAS, supra note 24, at 2.  
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has already been inflicted.55  To outsiders, the pictures may seem bizarre or 
banal, but to the people who share them and audiences equipped to “read” 
them, the images can be deeply emotionally resonant.  
The visuality of this conspiracy discourse may explain part of its online 
appeal.  Image-based content is more likely to be engaged with and shared on 
social media,56 making chemtrail content a natural fit for online information 
consumption behaviors.  It also fits well within the video format of YouTube.  
YouTube users seeking information, rather than entertainment, are more 
likely to interact with the content (liking, disliking, or commenting),57 and 
videos that prompt engagement are favored by YouTube’s algorithm when 
recommending new videos.58  Though many people engage with conspiracy 
theory content as an entertainment activity, many others sincerely believe the 
misinformation.59  
2.  The Numbers: Chemtrail Belief Is Widespread 
The content of the chemtrail conspiracy theory has been thoroughly and 
repeatedly debunked.60  Experts have refuted many supposedly anomalous 
contrails and contrail patterns documented as evidence, explaining the clouds 
as resulting from routine aircraft flight patterns and well-understood 
principles of atmospheric physics and chemistry.61  The supposed chemical 
 
 55. See Bakalaki, supra note 32, at 18 (analyzing Greek chemtrail conspiracy 
theory visual content).  
 56. Simon Rogers, What fuels a Tweet’s engagement?, TWITTER (Mar. 10, 
2014), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/a/2014/what-fuels-a-tweets-
engagement.html [https://perma.cc/A5UP-528A] (“Photos average a 35% boost 
in Retweets . . . Videos get a 28% boost”).  
 57. M. Laeeq Khan, Social Media Engagement: What Motivates User 
Participation and Consumption on YouTube?, 66 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 236, 
241 (2017).  
 58. The YouTube Team, Continuing our work to improve recommendations 
on YouTube, YOUTUBE (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://youtube.googleblog.com/2019/01/continuing-our-work-to-improve.html 
[https://perma.cc/R46D-EH2D] (reporting that YouTube’s recommended video 
“system . . . focus[es] on viewer satisfaction instead of views, measuring likes, 
dislikes, surveys, and time well spent”).  
 59. See, e.g., Dave Stopera, 19 of the Absolute Dumbest Things Flat Earthers 
Have Actually Said, BUZZFEED (Jan. 9, 2019) (humorous coverage of “flat earth” 
content).  
 60. E.g., LANGLEY RES. CTR., supra note 40 (explaining the causes of 
contrails and why their behavior and appearance varies).  
 61. Shearer et al., supra note 11, at 8 (“76 out of 77 (98.7%) of scientists 
[surveyed] said there was no evidence of [chemtrails], and that the data cited as 
evidence [for chemtrails] could be explained through other factors, such as typical 
contrail formation and poor data sampling instructions presented on [chemtrail] 
websites”.). 
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anomalies documented on the surface, furthermore, have been shown to be 
nonexistent or attributable to other causes.62  The chemtrail conspiracy theory 
is therefore verifiably or “patently” false – it conflicts with facts widely held 
by authoritative sources to be true.  Content promoting or substantiating the 
theory thus is misinformation.63 
Many people nonetheless believe in chemtrails and conflate them on 
social media with solar geoengineering.  A 2011 public survey of more than 
3000 people in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada found that 
“2.6% of the subjects believe that it is completely true that the government 
has a secret program that uses airplanes to put harmful chemicals into the air, 
and 14% of the sample believes that this is partly true.”64  A 2016 study of 
1000 Americans found that 10% believed the chemtrail conspiracy to be 
“completely” true, with another 20 to 30% saying the theory was “‘somewhat’ 
true, with no apparent difference by party affiliation or strength of 
partisanship” in responses.65  Separate analysis of five million social media 
posts revealed “conspiratorial views have accounted for [about] 60% of 
geoengineering discourse on social media over the past decade.”66  In 2019, 
analysis of 200 videos on YouTube discussing climate change, 
geoengineering, and chemtrails found that 92.5% of the search results for the 
terms “geoengineering” and “climate modification” “adhere to the ‘chemtrail’ 
conspiracy theory.”67 
The prevalence of this content on social media matters because social 
media is an important source of news.68  One survey found that two-thirds of 
U.S. adults report that they get news from social media (like Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube) at least sometimes,69 with 20% reporting they “often” 
get news from there.70  While nearly 60% of Americans in one survey reported 
they “expect the news they see on social media to be largely inaccurate,”71 
this may overstate public resilience to misinformation.  Empirical 
 
 62. Id. at 5.  
 63. For a definition of “misinformation,” see infra Part I.B.2. 
 64. Mercer et al., supra note 14, at 8.  
 65. Tingley & Wagner, supra note 14, at 2. 
 66. Id. at 3 (“The vast majority of social media posts falls into the chemtrails 
conspiracy camp (61%) [and] neutral science reporting is in the clear minority 
(6%).”).  
 67. Allgaier, supra note 15, at 1. 
 68. Elisa Shearer, Social Media Outpaces Print Newspapers in the U.S. as a 
News Source, PEW RES. CTR., Dec. 10, 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/12/10/social-media-outpaces-print-newspapers-in-the-u-s-as-a-news-
source/ [https://perma.cc/E7ZF-RWXW]. 
 69. Katerina Eva Matsa & Elisa Shearer, News Use Across Social Media 
Platforms, PEW RES. CTR., Sep. 10, 2018, 
https://www.journalism.org/2018/09/10/news-use-across-social-media-
platforms-2018/  [https://perma.cc/44WA-BV82]. 
 70. Shearer, supra note 68. 
 71. See Matsa & Shearer, supra note 69. 
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psychological literature reports that mere exposure to false factual assertions 
increases the likelihood that they will be believed.72  This phenomena has been 
called “illusory truth effect,”73 a restatement of the saying, “if people are told 
something often enough, they’ll believe it.”74  The underlying logic seems to 
be that familiarity with a statement, even if the listener is unaware that they 
have heard it before, eases information processing, which in turn becomes 
further evidence for the listener that the factual assertion is true.75  The illusory 
truth effect has been found to work for all but the most outlandishly false 
factual assertions, such as “the Earth is a perfect square.”76  The stickiness of 
chemtrail conspiracy theories online would seem to indicate that they are not 
“patently outlandish,” perhaps because chemtrail content relies so heavily on 
evidence that can be seen with the naked eye, while speculating on causal 
agents (“toxins,” “contamination”) that cannot be seen.77  Furthermore, belief 
in the chemtrail conspiracy likely requires only a few predicate ideas that are 
very widespread: distrust in government actors and scientific institutions and 
dismay over environmental and health harms from industrial pollution.78  
At the same time, trust in traditional authoritative institutions appears to 
be in decline.79  But what inspires trust in experts?  Philosopher Karen Jones 
provides an account of trust with two elements.80  The listener attributes 
“goodwill and competence” to the expert, while also believing the expert to 
“be directly and favorably moved” by the knowledge that the listener is 
 
 72. Lynn Hasher et al, Frequency and the Conference of Referential Validity, 
16 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 107, 111 (1977). 
 73. Ian Maynard Begg et al., Dissociation of Processes in Belief: Source 
Recollection, Statement Familiarity, and the Illusion of Truth, 121 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. GEN. 446, 446 (1992).  
 74. Hasher et al., supra note 72, at 112. 
 75. Ian Maynard Begg et al., supra note 73, at 457 (also arguing that this 
finding indicates that the human brain may use a model of belief wherein the 
subject “tacitly accepts” “newly registered information . . . as true pending more 
detailed analysis”). 
 76. Gordon Pennycook et al., Prior Exposure Increases Perceived Accuracy 
of Fake News, 147 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. GEN. 1865, 1867–68 (2018).  
 77. See Tingley & Wagner, supra note 14, at 2. 
 78. E.g., Carey Dunne, My Month with Chemtrails Conspiracy Theorists, 
THE GUARDIAN, May 22, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/may/22/california-conspiracy-
theorist-farmers-chemtrails  
[https://perma.cc/USP9-34DN] (profile of two organic farmers in California who 
became chemtrail conspiracy theorists).  
 79. See ECON. INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Democracy Index 2018: Me too? 
Political participation, protest, and democracy, The Economist (2019) (“Various 
global surveys . . . have demonstrated that confidence in democracy is on the 
wane” from 2010 to 2018.); cf. Cairns, supra note 20, at 78 (arguing that chemtrail 
conspiracy “beliefs reflect not so much a lack of science as a lack of trust”).  
 80. Karen Jones, Trust as an Affective Attitude, 107 ETHICS 4, 5–6 (1996). 
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relying on their expertise – that is, the expert embraces their role as a fiduciary 
to the listener.81  Such trust “can give rise to beliefs that are abnormally 
resistant to evidence.”82  By extension, distrust requires an attribution of bad 
faith or incompetence on the part of experts, or that they are otherwise 
mishandling the trust placed in them by their audience.83   
Using Jones’s account, we can propose that declining trust in traditional 
sources of authority arises from widespread, growing attributions of bad faith, 
incompetence, or other breaches in their roles as fiduciaries.  This could be 
driven in large part by improvements in information technology, which can 
quickly publicize abuse and misuse of power.  For example, the spread of 
phones with video cameras, combined with the rise of platforms like YouTube 
and Facebook that can quickly and widely disseminate footage, has sparked 
popular backlashes against government authorities across the world.84  Those 
same platforms also facilitate the spread of misinformation, inflaming feelings 
of mistrust by providing “evidence” to substantiate them,85 overwhelming 
users with false information.86 
B.  Misinformation Governance 
This Subpart elaborates on the concepts of “governance” and 
“misinformation.”  “Governance,” briefly put, encompasses the range of legal 
and “soft law” measures that governments and private authorities can use to 
achieve some public objective.  “Misinformation,” meanwhile, describes 
factual statements that are verifiably false and widely disseminated, regardless 
of the intent of the person who shares it.87  The discussion presents a new 
wrinkle in the challenge of governing chemtrail misinformation.88 
 
 81. Id. at 4. 
 82. Id. at 15.  
 83. Id. at 7.  
 84. See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo & Mike Isaac, Phone Cameras and Apps Help 
Speed Calls for Police Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015); and KAYE, supra note 
39, at 26 (describing “outrage and mass protests” against the Syrian government 
in 2011 after a YouTube video went viral depicting the brutalized body of a 
thirteen-year-old boy tortured and murdered by President Bashar al-Assad’s 
forces).  
 85. See Dietram A. Scheufele & Nicole M. Krause, Science Audiences, 
Misinformation, and Fake News, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7662, 7664–65 
(2019). 
 86. See Andrew Chadwick & Christian Vaccari, News Sharing on UK Social 
Media: Misinformation, Disinformation, and Correction Survey Report, at 23 
(Apr. 2019) (reporting exposure to false news stories on social media can harm 
“trust in news more broadly”). 
 87. Eur. Comm’n, A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Disinformation, at 6 
(2018). 
 88. E.g., Vicario et al., supra note 19, at 554. 
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1. “Governance” 
“Governance” describes the spectrum of methods used by those with 
power to influence or control conduct within their spheres of authority.89  
Those methods include traditional “hard” laws, like legislative law, 
administrative rules, and judge-made common law, as well as “unwritten 
norms, nonbinding principles and rules . . . market instruments, procedures, 
institutions funding, and international law.”90  In keeping with the many 
institutional actors exercising power over many overlapping spheres of 
influence, governance scholarship analyzes how these forces interact to 
influence and control behavior.91  Governance can thus be seen as a kind of 
quasi-contract, “a set of negotiated relationships between public and private 
actors” with regard to developing, implementing, and enforcing policy, 
leading to “aggregate accountability.”92  Governance scholarship accordingly 
tends to emphasize non-state sources of binding rules and standards.93 
Facebook, Google, and Twitter are U.S. companies influenced primarily 
by U.S. law and legal norms.94  Because the United States has extremely 
robust protections for individual speech rights,95 governance proposals for 
online misinformation emphasize self-regulatory models96 or a revamping of 
legal theories regarding free speech.97  There are some regulatory actions that 
the U.S. government can take, such as market interventions promoting more 
competition and market choices between social media platforms.98  But these 
 
 89. See Jonathan Verschuuren, International Governance and Law: State 
Regulation and Non-State Law, 1–2 (Hanneke van Schooten & Jonathan 
Verschuuren eds., 2008). 
 90. Jesse L. Reynolds, The Governance of Solar Geoengineering: Managing 
Climate Change in the Anthropocene, at 7 (2019).   
 91. See Klonick, supra note 19, at 1617 (describing “governance” as an 
“imprecise” name for the interaction between a “dynamic and iterative, law-
making process; norm-generating individuals; and convergence of processes and 
outcomes”). 
 92. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 543, 547–48, 665 (2000).  
 93. Verschuuren, supra note 89, at 1–2.  
 94. See Marvin Ammori, The “New” New York Times: Free Speech 
Lawyering in the Age of Google and Twitter, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2259, 2259–60 
(2014). 
 95. See infra Part III.B. 
 96. See Klonick, supra note 19, at 1662 (arguing for platform governance via 
“private governance and self-regulation”).  But even within Europe, which has 
less robust protections for free expression rights, regulators have emphasized a 
soft-law approach.  See EUR. COMM’N, supra note 87, at 6. 
 97. E.g., Nabiha Syed, Real Talk About Fake News: Towards a Better Theory 
for Platform Governance, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 337, 357 (2017). 
 98. See Jack Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 
2033–36 (2018). 
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approaches are removed from content moderation practices themselves, and 
it is doubtful that new platforms will necessarily mean better content 
practices.  Some government interventions could directly influence platform 
content moderation policies, such as removing protection from vicarious 
liability for user-posted content.99  Such a change, however, risks completely 
uprooting the business models of these platforms, making it something of a 
nuclear option.100  For all these reasons, misinformation governance 
discussions, including that of the analysis here, tend to emphasize non-state 
sources of regulation. 
2.  Misinformation, Disinformation, and Fake News 
Analysts sometimes define misinformation inductively: a few viral 
falsehoods online are named and described, with the general class of such 
statements called “misinformation.”101  This framing is insufficient in that it 
makes identifying misinformation seem easier than it actually is. 
 Misinformation could be more precisely defined as a verifiably false 
statement of fact, presented as true, that is published online or otherwise 
widely disseminated, including false rumors spread by word of mouth.102  
Disinformation is a type of misinformation, distinguished by the poster’s (a) 
knowledge that the content’s factual assertion is false and (b) improper 
purpose in disseminating the false assertion, such as to make money or distort 
public understanding of a subject.103 Disinformation thus can be distinguished 
by its malicious or pecuniary intent and reckless disregard for the truth.  Fake 
news can be misinformation, disinformation, or neither, depending on its 
veracity, the intent of its creator, the intent of the describer, and the reception 
or use of the material by its audience.104  The term is disfavored by 
misinformation experts due to governments using the label to attack 
journalists.105  It is therefore not used here. 
The problems of governing misinformation should be clear from its 
definition.  The Internet’s “marketplace of ideas” is filled with patently false 
 
 99. See Ammori, supra note 94, at 2286–2290 (describing the protections 
provided under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act). 
 100. Cf. EUR. COMM’N, supra note 87, at 5 (arguing against interventions that 
would have “harmful consequences for [the internet’s] functioning.”). 
 101. E.g., Vicario et al., supra note 19, at 554. 
 102. Cf. EUR. COMM’N, supra note 87, at 10 (defining misinformation as 
“misleading or inaccurate information shared by people who do not recognize it 
as such”).  
 103. Id.   
 104. See EUR. COMM’N, supra note 87. 
 105. See Caroline Lees, Fake News: The Global Silencer, 47 INDEX ON 
CENSORSHIP 88, 88 (2018). 
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assertions of fact.106  Furthermore, what is and is not “verifiably false” is often 
disputed, especially on important matters.  As a result, others who have 
confronted the problem of misinformation, like the European Commission, 
have focused more narrowly on disinformation.107  Theoretically, because 
disinformation involves reckless disregard for the truth and malicious intent, 
it can be sifted out from the morass of untrue statements, many of which are 
made and shared in good faith – so long as the regulator, be it state or platform, 
can detect the improper intent.  But when governing an item of 
misinformation, someone must decide whether the content or allegation is 
“verifiably” false.  In the case of widespread falsehoods, that decision will 
almost always be politically contested.  
Chemtrail conspiracy theorists genuinely believe what they assert.  
Because chemtrail content is created and shared without intent to deceive, it 
is misinformation but not disinformation: verifiably false and made in good 
faith.  The good faith of its creators and communities makes the content 
troubling and troublesome to govern: the false factual claims are intertwined 
with sincerely held belief.108  This presents an ethical and legal problem.  It 
runs counter to democratic values, especially in the United States, to directly 
censor beliefs solely because they are perceived as harmful to society as a 
whole.109  It also presents a practical problem.  Trust in an expert source “can 
give rise to beliefs that are abnormally resistant to evidence.”110  It is therefore 
worth carefully considering why conspiracy theory misinformation seems like 
a problem to so many.  This inquiry will inform what types of governance 
responses would be effective, legal, and morally acceptable regarding 
chemtrail content.  
C.  Conspiracies and the Chemtrail Problem Revisited 
“Conspiracy theory” is a pejorative phrase, but conspiracy theories 
should not be a per se suspect class of thought.111  After all, a conspiracy is a 
group of people working in secret “to do something criminal, illegal, or 
 
 106. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 626, 630 (1919) (introducing the 
notion of “free trade in ideas” into the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence). 
 107. EUR. COMM’N, supra note 87, at 10.  
 108. Han, supra note 35, at 194.  
 109. Compare United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 728 (2012) (“Society 
has the right and civic duty to engage in open, dynamic, rational discourse. Those 
ends are not well served when the government seeks to orchestrate public 
discussion through content-based mandates.”); with Balkin, supra note 98, at 2030 
(describing Germany’s strict laws governing moderation of social media 
companies of hate speech on their platforms). 
 110. Jones, supra note 80, at 15.  
 111. See DAVID COADY, WHAT TO BELIEVE NOW: APPLYING EPISTEMOLOGY 
TO CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, 110–12 (2012). 
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reprehensible.”112  A conspiracy theory, meanwhile, is a collection of ideas 
and evidence that seeks to explain an event or pattern of events as being 
caused by such a secret plot.113  A brief look back at the intrigues of world 
history confirms that conspiracies have caused many significant historical 
events; hence we are all conspiracy theorists.114  When stripped of its 
pejorative and marginalizing connotations, a conspiracy theory becomes just 
another type of theory.  Determining each one’s worth should therefore 
include an assessment of its supporting evidence and coherence, which is why 
this Article took some space to cite scientific evidence debunking chemtrail 
conspiracy theories.115   
What is almost always meant by the phrase “conspiracy theories” is more 
precisely stated as epistemically suspect conspiracy theories: ideas that 
“conflict with common naturalistic conceptions of the world.”116  This 
definition does not say that the world is as it seems to be.  Instead, it says there 
is an agreed-upon set of factual claims that orders our shared sense of reality 
( “the Earth is round;” “the capital of New York is Albany;” “no humans are 
secretly lizards”).  Certain beliefs that contradict these well-established and 
widely believed factual findings – what could be called common sense – are 
verifiably or patently false.  Chemtrail conspiracy theories fit within this 
category.  They assert that jet contrails are covert implements of 
environmental contamination and mind control, a belief which is contradicted 
by authoritative expert testimony, physical evidence, and common sense.117  
They are therefore epistemically suspect. 
The problem is not conspiratorial ideation in itself.  Perhaps surprisingly, 
the governance problem is not even belief itself in “epistemically suspect” 
conspiratorial ideation from flat-earthers, anti-vaxxers, 9/11 truthers, 
Holocaust deniers, reptilian-humanoid believers, COVID-19 minimizers, and 
chemtrailers.  These communities can create conditions that give rise to 
serious social harms, such as lowered vaccine rates driven by anti-vaxxer 
 
 112. Conspiracy, DICTIONARY.COM, 
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/conspiracy [https://perma.cc/G6ES-RN8L] 
(last visited May 29, 2020).).  
 113. See MATTHEW R. X. DENTITH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONSPIRACY 
THEORIES 173 (2014). 
 114. Id. at 174; Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Conspiracy Theories: 
Causes and Cures, 17 J. POLIT. PHILOS. 202, 204 (2009). 
 115. See COADY, supra note 111, at 131.  
 116. Gordon Pennycook et al., On the Reception and Detection of Psuedo-
Profound Bullshit, 10 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 549, 551 (2015); see also 
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 114, at 204 (arguing the conspiracy theories 
worthy of government sanction are those that are “false, harmful, and unjustified 
(in the epistemological sense)”). 
 117. See THE KEITH GROUP, supra note 30 (debunking the theory). 
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss3/5
2020] GOVERNING CONSPIRACY THEORY MISINFORMATION 655 
misinformation,118 potentially more severe COVID-19 outbreaks from failing 
to social distance,119 or terrorism prompted by white nationalist conspiracy 
theories about Jews, Muslims, and Black people.120  Those social problems 
are, obviously, legitimate objects of state and private governance, and 
appropriate governance responses must consider how conspiratorial ideation 
and patent falsehoods facilitate harm and violence.   
But misinformation governors should be wary of trying to stamp out 
belief in baseless conspiracy theories.  First, it would be a fool’s errand.  
Conspiracy theories, including the outlandish and genuinely outrageous, have 
deep roots in U.S. political culture,121 and are likely an inevitable outcome of 
social life.122  Second, such a project would intrude too deeply on activities 
protected by free speech and free association rights.  Third, it would be likely 
to backfire.  As legal scholar Tim Wu describes, “The government is, 
effectively, a kind of celebrity whose actions draw disproportionate attention. 
And such attention may overcome the greatest barrier facing a disfavored 
speaker: that of getting heard at all.”123  Official efforts to combat conspiracy 
theories thus could inadvertently spread and legitimize those ideas among 
people already mistrustful of the government.124 
Source- and fact-selection based on ideological preference is an old 
problem.125  What is new, however, is the ease of publishing and widely 
disseminating information without needing to navigate traditional gatekeepers 
of mass media.  Technological developments have allowed for a large number 
 
 118. See N. Fournet et al., Under-Vaccinated Groups in Europe and Their 
Beliefs, Attitudes, and Reasons for Non-Vaccination; Two Systematic Reviews, 18 
BMC PUB. HEALTH 1 (2018). 
 119. See Max Fisher, Why Coronavirus Conspiracy Theories Flourish. And 
Why It Matters, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2020). 
 120. Tina Besley & Michael A. Peters, Terrorism, Trauma, Tolerance: 
Bearing Witness to White Supremacist Attack on Muslims in Christchurch, New 
Zealand, 42 EDUC. PHILOS. & THEORY 109, 112 (2019) (describing how some 
white nationalist terrorism is motivated by an intellectual tradition of racist 
conspiratorial ideation). 
 121. Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, HARPER’S 
MAG. 77, 77–81 (Nov. 1964).  
 122. See COADY, supra note 111, at 115.  
 123. Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, 117 MICH. L. REV. 547, 559 
(2018). 
 124. See Melissa Healy, Misinformation About the Coronavirus Abounds, But 
Correcting It Can Backfire, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2020) (citing misinformation 
scholars Brendan Nyhan, Joshua Introne, and Emerson Brooking). 
 125. The Philosopher’s Zone with David Rutledge, Facts and Truth in a Post-
Truth World, AUSTRALIAN BROAD. CORP. (Oct. 15, 2017) (interview with David 
Coady, finding precedent for the internet’s “epistemic panic” in Gutenberg’s 
printing press), 
https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/philosopherszone/facts,-and-
trust-in-a-post-truth-world/8997168 [https://perma.cc/7ZNN-25S8].  
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of self-professed experts to proliferate, experts who are, in turn, connected 
with unprecedented ease of access to information consumers.  But the 
information economy is not suddenly without any gatekeepers at all.  The new 
arbiters of fact are search engines and social media companies whose 
“platforms are optimized for engagement,” and, by extension, “optimiz[ed] 
. . . for confirmation bias.”126  
The question, then, is not how to stop baseless conspiracy theories from 
existing. It is how to limit their spread and influence.   Therefore we should 
also ask how much public online attention chemtrailers should get.  This 
Article argues they should get as little attention as possible, without resorting 
to direct suppression or censorship.  Chemtrailer beliefs are not the problem 
– or, specifically, not a governance problem.  The governance problem instead 
is that automated mechanisms of social media platforms and search engines 
widely and uncritically disseminate their false claims to people who would 
otherwise not encounter them.127  To that end, governance proposals should 
seek to influence social media companies’ design choices, which result in the 
amplification of patently false, but often alluring,128 factual claims made by 
conspiracy theory social networks.  But better content management by 
centralized Internet authorities is an incomplete response (and risks other, 
perhaps more troubling, problems).  There is also the problem of information-
user gullibility: some people appear overly credulous regarding factual 
assertions from trusted sources.129  Good governance of misinformation 
would also include instilling an attitude of wariness or skepticism concerning 
new factual claims, as well as research and analytic tools to build informed 
trust in sources of authority.  By design, such a program could not dictate 
which sources of authority are to be trusted.  It could, however, help equip 
people to navigate the new information economy we find ourselves in. 
D.  Limits of Misinformation Governance: Climate Denialism 
Discussion of chemtrail falsehoods brings to mind climate denialism, a 
different category of misinformation.  Why is chemtrail conspiracy content 
relatively easy to propose as a target for governance, but climate denialism 
much harder?  Climate denialism, after all, peddles in baseless conspiracy 
 
 126. Id. (interview with Mark Alfano). 
 127. See, e.g., Dunne, supra note 78 (the subjects became conspiracy theorists 
after one saw a post from a chemtrail conspiracy group on Facebook); Casey 
Newton, The Trauma Floor, THE VERGE (Feb. 25, 2019) (reporting that one 
content moderator working on behalf of Facebook became a Holocaust denier 
while another became a 9/11 truther).   
 128. TODOR HRISTOV, IMPOSSIBLE KNOWLEDGE: CONSPIRACY THEORIES, 
POWER, AND TRUTH 92 (2019) (arguing that coming to believe in conspiracy 
theories is akin to “seduction”).   
 129. Pennycook & Rand, supra note 18, at 186 (charitably describing 
gullibility as “reflexive open-mindedness”).  
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theories to make sense of its logically inconsistent factual assertions.130  The 
difference, of course, is that climate denialism has been integrated into the 
Republican Party131 and the conservative movement,132 an institution and an 
ideology powerful within U.S. society.  It is difficult to imagine methods of 
vigorously governing “legitimate misinformation,” given the obvious 
roadblocks to building political consensus and the incentives of privately-
owned platforms to avoid appearing partisan in their content moderation 
decisions.  Chemtrail conspiracy theories, on the other hand, have not been 
integrated into the belief systems of a major U.S. political party – not yet, 
anyway.133  This means their spread and fallout remain an uncontroversial 
target for governance.  Perhaps consideration of a kind of misinformation that 
nearly all agree is patently false will lead to methods which temper the appeal 
and spread of mistruths and falsehoods which are more widespread, though I 
am not optimistic at this prospect.134  It would be far better to limit the spread 
of patent falsehoods before they take root in more prominent quarters.  
III.  REGULATING MISINFORMATION 
This Part surveys the governance tools available for misinformation, as 
well as the ways that prevailing legal structures, business operations, and free 
speech norms constrain the endeavor.  It first argues that governing public 
discourse is ethically permissible, and then shows that First Amendment 
doctrine effectively bars most direct government regulation of patently false 
factual statements.  It proceeds to analyze the content moderation values and 
practices of the entities that have filled the vacuum left by the First 
Amendment: large social media platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and 
 
 130. Stephan Lewandowsky et al., ‘Alice in Wonderland’ Mechanics of the 
Rejection of (Climate) Science: Simulating Coherence by Conspiracism, 195 
SYNTHESE 175, 190 (2018) (“Climate science denial is therefore perhaps best 
understood as a rational activity that replaces a coherent body of science with an 
incoherent and conspiracist body of pseudo-science for political reasons and with 
considerable political coherence and effectiveness.”). 
 131. Justin Farrell et al., Evidence-Based Strategies to Combat Scientific 
Misinformation 9 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 191, 191 (2019).  
 132. Matthew T. Ballew et al., Does Socioeconomic Status Moderate the 
Political Divide on Climate Change? The Roles of Education, Income, and 
Individualism, 60 GLOB. ENVTL. CHANGE no. 102024, 7 (finding “conservatives 
with more education . . . are significantly less likely than those with less education 
. . . to believe that global warming is human-caused.”). 
 133. But see Cairns, supra note 20, at 79.  
 134. But see John Cook, Understanding and Countering Misinformation about 
Climate Change, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON DECEPTION, FAKE NEWS, AND 
MISINFORMATION ONLINE 281, 287–89 (2019) (proposing new responses for 
climate misinformation, such as automated flagging of misinformation indicators 
and “inoculation” of communities against patently false content). 
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Twitter.  It closes with an analysis of content moderation practices in Europe, 
where governments take a more active role in combating misinformation.  
A. Should We Govern? 
A frequent rhetorical move within misinformation governance literature 
is to first express uneasiness with the idea of “governing” public discourse 
and then to explain why various crises make intervention necessary.  There is 
a pervasive sense that something is wrong;135 uncertainty as to what the exact 
causes are136 and what the responses should be;137 and unease about 
influencing people’s information consumption habits.138  
It is a common view that directly controlling public discourse is outside 
the bounds of a legitimate governance inquiry: “Our constitutional tradition 
stands against the idea that we need Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.”139  But such 
value statements are belied by the tradition within the United States to limit 
socially undesirable speech through the editorial decisions of private mass 
media companies, as well as through the decentralized enforcement of social 
norms against undesirable speech.140  When superseding government control 
over the determination of factual truth, the “marketplace for ideas” must rely 
 
 135. Mike Masnick, Protocols, Not Platforms: A Technological Approach to 
Free Speech, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INSTIT. COLUM. U. (Aug. 21, 2019). 
 136. Letter from Jameel Jaffer et al., Knight First Amendment Institute at 
Columbia University, to Mark Zuckerberg, C.E.O., Facebook, (Aug. 6, 2018), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/kfai-
documents/documents/d6ebc73dd9/Facebook_Letter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N7G9-NEHB] (arguing that basic research is needed to 
understand how Facebook’s algorithms influence the sharing of content).  
 137. See, e.g., Matthew C. Sullivan, Libraries and Fake News: What’s the 
Problem? What’s the Plan?, 13 COMMS. INFO. LITERACY 91, 95 (2019). 
 138. See, e.g., Emily Birnbaum, Tech Giants Pressed in House Hearing on 
Policing Extremist Content, THE HILL (June 26, 2019) (quoting one 
congresswoman’s comparison of Google’s search algorithm tweaks to the 
workings of the Ministry of Truth in George Orwell’s 1984).  To give a personal 
example, when a colleague heard the idea for this paper, they said it sounded less 
like a governance topic and more like “propaganda.” 
 139. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012).  
 140. Ammori, supra note 94, at 2281 (describing informal regulation of hate 
speech offline); see also Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, KNIGHT 
FIRST AMEND. INST. COLUM. U. (Sep. 1, 2017), 
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete 
[https://perma.cc/W6RH-J7DJ] (“John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty seemed to take 
Victorian sensibilities as a greater threat to freedom than anything the government 
might do.” (citing On Liberty and Other Writings 69 (Stefan Collini ed., 
Cambridge University Press 1989) (1859) (“These tendencies of the times cause 
the public to be more disposed than at most former periods to prescribe general 
rules of conduct, and endeavour to make every one conform to the approved 
standard.”)). 
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on private actors, informed by threat of indirect government intervention, to 
promote a healthy public discourse.   
Defining a “healthy” public discourse is dependent on subjective belief, 
but one can confidently assert that it would contain minimal serious 
consideration of chemtrails, hollow-Earth-reptilians, or fluoride-based mind-
control initiatives carried out by agents of the Illuminati.  The squeamishness 
many people have for the topic of governing speech should not be minimized.  
But a conversation on misinformation can proceed, especially with the 
knowledge that such governance is already underway and always has been.  
We should embrace our misgivings as we consider misinformation 
governance in greater depth.  Reluctance, and even paranoia, can be useful 
tools while assessing governance interventions.   
B. Patently False Statements of Fact Under the First Amendment 
Patently false statements of fact receive a very high level of protection 
under the First Amendment, so long as they are not made in a commercial 
context141 or inflict concrete, “legally cognizable harm” to someone else, like 
fraud, or to certain official processes, like perjury.142  Whether the protection 
they receive from content-based restrictions is absolute, or merely very high, 
is ambiguous, but that they are strongly protected is clear.143  As a result, a 
law censoring patently false statements because of their falsity – or the general 
social harms they cause – would be unconstitutional.  
The theoretical reasons for this high level of protection turn on the 
necessary relationship between false speech and free and open public debate.  
The foundational U.S. Supreme Court opinions underlying First Amendment 
free speech doctrine were concerned with free speech’s relationship to 
arriving at ideological truth, not for determining verifiable statements of 
fact;144  throughout the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court treated 
 
 141. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (reciting the test for identifying misleading commercial 
speech).  
 142. Alverez, 567 U.S. at 718–19; but see Erwin Chemerinsky, False Speech 
and the First Amendment, 71 OKLAHOMA L. REV. 1, 5–10 (2018) (arguing First 
Amendment doctrine on false speech is inevitably inconsistent because each case 
must “balance[e] competing interests”).  Reading Chemerinsky, one could reason 
“legally cognizable harm” is a moving target.  Id. at 6.  
 143. Compare Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 729–30 (Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion) 
(applying a standard of “exacting scrutiny”) with id. at 730 (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (using an intermediate “proportionality” standard of review).  
 144. Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 
897, 906 (2010) (“For Learned Hand, for Oliver Wendell Holmes, for Louis 
Brandeis . . . the issue . . . was advocacy and not description . . . . [V]irtually none 
of the most prominent First Amendment writings and judicial opinions of the era 
even touched on the issues of verifiable factual truth or demonstrable factual 
falsity.)”  
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false statements as having zero constitutional value in themselves.145  New 
York Times, Co. v. Sullivan recognized, however, “[t]hat erroneous statement 
is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of 
expression are to have the breathing space that they need to survive.”146  The 
First Amendment thus limits the ability of public officials to bring defamation 
actions, requiring they show the speaker acted  “actual malice” when they 
made the false statement.147  
United States. v. Alvarez built upon this line of thinking, with six 
members of the Court declaring the Stolen Valor Act, a federal law 
criminalizing certain intentional and verifiably false assertions of fact, 
unconstitutional.148  The law criminalized falsely representing oneself “to 
have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the 
Armed Forces of the United States,” punishable by fine or up to a year of 
imprisonment.149  Defendant Xavier Alverez was a member of a water district 
board in California and, while speaking at a public meeting in that capacity, 
falsely claimed to be a recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor.150  It 
was undisputed that Alvarez intentionally made the statement despite 
knowing it was false.151 
Writing for the plurality, Justice Kennedy stated there was no “general 
exception to the First Amendment for false statements.  This comports with 
the common understanding that some false statements are inevitable if there 
is to be an open and vigorous expression of views in public and private 
conversation.”152  Kennedy rejected the argument that false statements do not 
receive First Amendment protections, distinguishing the law at issue in 
Alvarez, which “targets falsity and nothing more,” from laws and causes of 
action targeting speech-based harms like defamation, fraud, or perjury.  In 
those cases where speech receives less protection, there is a “legally 
 
 145. Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Speech, 115 MICH. L. REV. 439, 449–50 
(2017); but see Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 719 (characterizing such precedents as “all 
derive[d] from cases discussing defamation, fraud, or some other legally 
cognizable harm associated with a false statement . . . [not for] their falsity and 
nothing more.”).  
 146. 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 142, at 
6–7.  
 147. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80.  (Actual malice is “knowledge 
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”). 
 148. 567 U.S. 709 (Justice Kennedy wrote the plurality, joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor; Justice Breyer filed a 
concurrence joined by Justice Kagan.).  
 149. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b)–(c), invalidated by Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724.  
 150. 567 U.S. at 714–15.  
 151. Id. at 715; see also id. at 713–714 (“Lying was his habit. Xavier Alvarez 
. . . [had] lied when he said he played hockey for the Detroit Red Wings and that 
he once married a starlet from Mexico . . . . For all the record shows, respondent’s 
statements were but a pathetic attempt to gain respect that eluded him.”).  
 152. Id. at 718.  
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cognizable harm associated with a false statement,” such as damage to 
reputation, monetary loss, or frustration of a court’s truth-seeking process at 
trial.153  The Stolen Valor Act did not require a finding of such a harm and 
was thus far too sweeping in its reach.154  
It was the statute’s broad sweep that seems to have motivated Breyer’s 
concurrence, which used an interest-balancing “proportionality” test instead 
of the plurality’s categorical approach.155  Breyer reasoned that “false factual 
statements enjoy little First Amendment protection,” but that “[l]ittle does not 
mean none.”156  The Stolen Valor Act’s sanction against false statements, 
without articulating specific harms to a person or a special process (like a trial 
court), was too sweeping to survive constitutional scrutiny.157  Generalized 
harm against the honor of all military award recipients was not a sufficient 
government interest to justify the broad criminal sanction.158 
Alvarez would clearly prohibit a law banning misinformation on a 
certain topic on the basis of its falsity alone, no matter the rationale articulated 
or the harms the government sought to avoid.159  Under the First Amendment, 
the “remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true” – that is, no legal 
remedy at all.160  Governments and private actors seeking to limit the harms 
of false statements must resort to counterspeech, such as public relations 
campaigns and debunking materials.  Many commentators, however, are 
skeptical of the ability of counterspeech to correct harms after patently false 
statements are made.161  For example, tagging a piece of false news as 
“disputed” seems to do little to dilute the apparent truth of false statements to 
which people have been repeatedly exposed.162  Content further does not 
spread uniformly across social media,163 and fact-checking content is rarely 
 
 153. Id. at 718–19.  
 154. Id. at 718, 722.  
 155. Id. at 731. 
 156. Id. at 732–33.  
 157. Id. at 739.  
 158. Id.   
 159. See also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (“The First 
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of 
speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of social costs and benefits.”).   
 160. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 727.  
 161. E.g., Dawn Carla Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, 94 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1519, 1521 (2019); Han, supra note 35 at 193–94; Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Fake News, Weaponized Defamation and the First Amendment, 47 
SW. L. REV. 291, 292 (2018); and Schauer, supra note 144, at 910–911; but see 
Thomas P. Crocker, Free Speech and Terrorist Speech: An Essay on Dangerous 
Ideas, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 49, 51 (2017) (arguing the marketplace of ideas 
can and should be relied on to provide counter-speech). 
 162. See Gordon Pennycook et al., supra note 76, at 1874–75.  
 163. See Del Vicario et al., supra note 19, at 558 (“Users tend to aggregate in 
communities of interest, which causes reinforcement and fosters confirmation 
bias, segregation, and polarization. This comes at the expense of the quality of the 
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shared among the same communities that spread the targeted 
misinformation.164  Finally, the Internet has also reworked basic assumptions 
of the information economy, creating a scarcity of attention rather than of 
speakers.165  This greatly empowers the companies that control the dominant 
platforms structuring users’ activities and attentions online, limiting the 
ability of outside actors to independently disseminate counterspeech. 
In any event, the consensus of the U.S. courts and legal scholars on this 
point is virtually unanimous – false statements of fact cannot be suppressed 
by the government solely on the basis of their falsity.  For some, it is because 
the line drawing would be too hard: false statements of fact are “ideologically 
inflected,” that is, intertwined with worldviews and values to the point that 
they are inseparable from the most valued and protected domains of speech.166  
For others, it is a gut-level distrust at the thought of any government 
interference in public discourse, based on fears of chilling speech.167  Even 
within European legal regimes, which exhibit less skepticism toward state 
interference with public discourse, there is a reluctance toward allowing 
governments to censor “bad” speech outright at the expense of free expression 
values.168  Instead of content-based controls promulgated by the state, public-
private partnerships emphasizing self-regulation by social media platforms 
are central to European misinformation management plans.169 
It all makes for a curious result.  Low-value or outright harmful speech 
is shielded from most assertions of government authority, ceding most control 
to the private platforms that have the power and influence to shape public 
discourse.170  It is somewhat strange that so many trust private mass media 
 
information and leads to proliferation of biased narratives fomented by 
unsubstantiated rumors, mistrust, and paranoia.”). 
 164. Jieun Shin & Kjerstin Thorson, Partisan Selective Sharing: The Biased 
Diffusion of Fact-Checking Messages on Social Media, 67 J. COMM. 233, 250 
(2017) (observing “partisan selective sharing” of fact-checking content shared on 
social media).  
 165. Syed, supra note 97, at 352.  
 166. Mark Tushnet, “Telling Me Lies”: The Constitutionality of Regulating 
False Statements of Fact, HARV. L. SCH. PUB. LAW & LEGAL THEORY, working 
paper no. 11-02 18 (2011) (analyzing the patently false factual claims of 
Holocaust deniers and 9/11 truthers).  
 167. See, e.g., Han, supra note 35, at 189–90. 
 168. EUR. COMM’N, supra note 87, at 1 (While disinformation “impairs 
freedom of expression . . . [t]he primary obligation of state actors in relation to 
freedom of expression and media freedom is to refrain from interference and 
censorship and to ensure a favorable environment for inclusive and pluralistic 
public debate.”).  
 169. Id. at 6.  
 170. For example, Michael C. Dorf and Sidney G. Tarrow use the counter-
intuitively high level of protection afforded to patently false factual assertions as 
a starting point in their examination of the lack of protection given to journalists 
in their pursuit of high-value investigative projects.  See generally Stings and 
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companies so much more than governments to do this work, or, better put, 
fear them so much less, especially in the case of patently false, pervasive, and 
extremely harmful misinformation.171  There are, however, a number of viable 
governance options still available within a framework that centers on self-
regulation by private media companies.  The advantage of such an approach 
is that it does not require a fundamental rethinking of widely held free-
expression values, or piloting an overhaul of First Amendment doctrine 
through the Supreme Court.  
C. Contemporary Models of “Self”-Regulation 
This Subpart surveys the factors and institutional structures that inform 
the content moderation decisions of major social media platforms like 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.  These social media companies have 
developed content moderation policies with an eye on limiting government 
regulation, remaining in alignment with American free speech values, and 
increasing company profits by maximizing the size of their user base.  
Examination of these companies’ motives and practices can identify sources 
of leverage stakeholders have to drive the creation of better misinformation 
controls on social media, including chemtrail content.  Though much of the 
literature envisions misinformation governance as stemming from “self”-
regulation, it is clear that outside groups, including governments, must work 
to influence the way these companies moderate and disseminate content.  
1. Internet Law in the United States 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) protects 
digital intermediaries like Facebook and YouTube from most liability 
associated with user content on their platforms.172  The law declares that 
platforms shall not “be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information” 
posted by users, preventing vicarious tort or criminal liability for most kinds 
of content from flowing from the content creator to the content publisher.173  
Many business leaders view Section 230 of the CDA as essential to the 
operation of today’s Internet because social media companies would 
otherwise risk overwhelming liability for speech-based harms from user 
content on their platforms.174  In exchange for this shield from liability, digital 
 
Scams: “Fake News,” the First Amendment, and the New Activist Journalism, 20 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2017).  
 171. Contra Balkin, supra note 98, at 2035 (“[I]t is especially important . . . to 
prevent a small number of powerful for-profit companies from dominating how 
public opinion is organized and governed.”).  
 172. VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RES. SERV., FREE SPEECH AND THE 
REGULATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT 10–11, (2019) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 
230(c)(1), (f)). 
 173. 42 U.S.C. §230(c)(1); see also BRANNON, supra note 172, at 11.  
 174. Ammori, supra note 94, at 2287.  
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intermediaries are expected to self-regulate “offensive material” on their 
platforms.175  To that end, Section 230 further shields digital intermediaries 
from liability for good faith removal of such material from their websites.176  
The CDA is therefore, arguably, the most important law protecting free speech 
online, in some ways more so than First Amendment doctrine created by the 
Supreme Court.177   
Constitutional law still plays an important role in structuring speech 
protections online.  For example, a different section of the Communications 
Decency Act, banning “indecency” and “patently offensive” content on 
Internet platforms, was struck down under the First Amendment in Reno v. 
American Civil Liberties Union.178  The Supreme Court found “no basis for 
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied” to 
online content, and that the statute’s operative language was vague and overly 
broad, and thus unacceptably burdensome on speech.179  Furthermore, it 
seems possible that the decisions digital intermediaries make on which 
content to promote or deemphasize on their platforms is itself protected 
speech under the First Amendment, through use of what some legal scholars 
call “the editorial analogy.”180  Following this line of reasoning, digital 
intermediaries can be seen as speakers under the First Amendment because 
they “convey information [they have] prepared or compiled,” “direct users to 
material created by others,” and “select and sort the results” in a way those 
companies see as “most helpful and useful.”181  This line of reasoning links 
the holding of Reno, that the First Amendment protects speech online to the 
same extent as offline speech, with the holding from Miami Herald Publishing 
Co. v. Tornillo, protecting editorial decisions over the content run in 
newspapers.182  As the Court found in Miami Herald:  
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made 
as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of 
public issues and public officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute 
the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be 
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can 
 
 175. Klonick, supra note 19, at 1606 (citing Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 
129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Another important purpose of § 230 was to 
encourage service providers to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive 
material over their services.”)).   
 176. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and 
screening of offensive material.”).  
 177. Ammori, supra note 94, at 2264.  
 178. 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997). 
 179. Id. at 870–871.  
 180. Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, First Amendment Protection for 
Search Engine Results, 883, 887 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 883 (2012) (commissioned 
by Google).  
 181. See id. at 884.  
 182. Id. at 886–88 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1977)). 
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be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free 
press as they have evolved to this time.183 
This “editorial analogy” could extend to the algorithm design decisions 
of social media companies, search engines, and other digital intermediaries.  
While the extent of this protection is unsettled184 and disputed,185 it seems that 
the publishing and content-sharing activities of these companies could receive 
a high level of constitutional protection.  But extending the editorial analogy 
brings to mind related ethical, if non-legal, obligations based on newsrooms 
and news editors: a commitment to truth and an eye on the public interest.   
2. The Content Moderation Values of Social Media Platforms 
 Just because there are strict limitations on government regulation of 
online content does not mean that online spaces are anarchic.  Facebook, 
YouTube, and Twitter instead should be considered “governors” of the digital 
spaces they control: “private self-regulating entities that are economically and 
normatively motivated to reflect the democratic culture and free speech 
expectations of their users.”186  Lawyers trained in the U.S. legal tradition 
have shaped the content policies of these U.S. companies, leading to content 
moderation cultures heavily influenced by First Amendment commitments to 
free expression values.187  The policies, however, are more restrictive than the 
First Amendment would allow for a state actor regulating hate speech, 
harassment, threats, pornography, depictions of violence, and incitement.188  
This is because platforms seek “to build a culture most amenable to mass 
engagement,” and thus maximize profits.189  Some constitutionally protected 
speech is bad for business.  
Within this framework, the platform preferences of users are one of the 
very few tools outside interests have to influence the content decisions of large 
social media companies.  In this so-called “marketplace for rules,” social 
media users will hop between platforms based on the content and user 
 
 183.Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 
241, 258 (1974).  
 184. BRANNON, supra 172, at 22 (“There are not many court decisions 
evaluating whether a social media site, by virtue of reprinting, organizing, or even 
editing protected speech, is itself exercising free speech rights. The few federal 
court decisions finding such protections “are, so far, limited to trial courts and 
therefore not precedential beyond the facts of those cases.”). 
 185. See generally Heather Whitney, Search Engines, Social Media, and the 
Editorial Analogy, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. COLUM. U. (Feb. 27, 2018) 
(arguing that the analogy between search engines and newspapers is unpersuasive 
and that the legal results are not normatively desirable).  
 186. Klonick, supra note 19, at 1669–70. 
 187. Syed, supra 97, at 339 (quoting Klonick, supra note 19, at 1599).  
 188. Ammori, supra note 94, at 2269–70, 2274.  
 189. Syed, supra note 97, at 244.  
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interactions tolerated on the site, with competing platforms adjusting their 
moderation policies and content-promoting algorithms to best meet user 
expectations.190  Platform-switching can be a powerful tool.  For example, in 
2016 user pressure forced Twitter to implement stricter content moderation 
policies to limit harassment on the platform.191  Twitter’s about-face is all the 
more significant because of its outspoken commitment to free speech values, 
even relative to other digital intermediaries – “the free speech wing of the free 
speech party.”192  This history indicates that public pressure by influential user 
groups can produce tangible improvements in social media platform 
management.  
The content policies and enforcement practices of these intermediaries 
should therefore be examined to see how these free speech values are 
practiced.  The remainder of this part focuses on Facebook because of its large 
size and influence, as well as the greater availability of scholarship.193  Fuller 
analysis would take account of the content moderation policies of other big 
online platforms, like YouTube, Twitter, and Reddit.194  It is also worth noting 
at the outset that the implications of these policies for misinformation can 
reach far beyond the walls of a given platform.  For example, misinformation 
cascades online often interact in feedback loops with traditional media 
channels, amplifying the content, and bolstering its appearance of 
credibility.195  Focusing on one social media platform alone does not capture 
the whole picture.  
 
 190. Klonick, supra note 19, at 1629 (citing David G. Post, Anarchy, State, 
and the Internet: An Essay on Law-Making in Cyberspace, J. ONLINE L. art. 3 
(1995)). 
 191. Klonick, supra note 19, at 1629.  
 192. Ammori, supra note 94, at 2260 (quoting Josh Halliday, Lawyer and 
Champion of Free Speech Alex MacGillivray to Leave Twitter, THE GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 30, 2013) (attributing the statement to former Twitter general counsel Alex 
MacGillivray)).  
 193. See Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Reports Third Quarter 2019 
Results (Jan. 29, 2020) https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/facebook-
reports-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2019-results-300995616.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q2BG-4ZJZ] (reporting 1.66 billion daily average users during 
the month of December 2019, with a total of 2.50 billion monthly active users) 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2020). 
 194. E.g., Nunziato, supra note 161, at 1549 (reporting Twitter’s 
misinformation policies include suspending fake accounts and prioritizing higher 
quality content in its algorithm); see also Syed, supra note 97, at 343 (describing 
Reddit’s model of leaving content moderation to its hundreds of thousands of user 
communities). 
 195. See, e.g., Charlie Warzel, How One Pro-Trump Site Keeps a Debunked 
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3.  Practicing Moderation: The Legal Flavor of Facebook’s Content 
Policies 
Facebook Community Standards webpages, as well as several releases 
from its press shop, reveal the general principles and enforcement strategies 
behind the platform’s content moderation policies.  The company states that 
“[t]he goal of our Community Standards has always been to create a place for 
free expression and give people a voice,” limiting speech only to the extent 
necessary to protect the values of authenticity, safety, privacy, and dignity.196  
A backdrop of international human rights explicitly informs this interest 
balancing.  One blogpost by Facebook cites Article 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) as informing its content 
policies.197  Per Facebook, the ICCPR “set[s] the standards for when it’s 
appropriate to place restrictions on freedom of expression.”198  Of course, as 
an international treaty, the ICCPR binds countries who are party to the 
agreement, setting forth the rights of individuals vis-à-vis the state as well as 
the obligations of states to protect those rights.199  It does not establish the 
rights of users vis-à-vis privately owned and operated platforms.  It is 
interesting then to see Facebook directly cite the treaty as though it directly 
applied to its decisions.200  The relevant part of Article 19 of the ICCPR reads:  
Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference . . . 
[and] to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds . . . subject 
to certain restrictions . . . such as are provided by law and are necessary 
. . .  [f]or the respect of the rights or reputations of others. . .  [or] [f]or 
 
 196. FACEBOOK, Community Standards: Introduction, 
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/introduction 
[https://perma.cc/BV75-TK2S] (last visited Mar. 6, 2020). 
 197. Richard Allen, Hard Questions: Where Do We Draw the Line on Free 
Expression, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Aug. 9, 2018), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/08/hard-questions-free-expression/ 
[https://perma.cc/7QQK-85NJ]; see also Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-
14668-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/L53W-XJUL] (entered into force Mar. 23, 
1976). 
 198. Allen, supra note 197. 
 199. Art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 200. But see U.N. Human Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression et al., Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake News”, 
Disinformation and Propaganda, FOM.GAL/3/17 4 (Mar. 3, 2017), 
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/8/302796.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XN3-
TM5R] (recommending principles to guide digital intermediaries in their content 
moderation policies).  
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the protection of national security or of public order . . . or of public 
health or morals.201  
Facebook interprets this language as allowing restrictions on speech only 
where “necessary to prevent harm,” including hate speech, which “can 
constitute harm [in itself] because it creates an environment of intimidation 
and exclusion.”202  This reasoning accords with the “broad consensus in the 
international community – manifested by treaties, conventions, and protocols 
– that virulent group defamation” is intimately connected to “a variety of 
crimes against humanity.”203  
Even assuming the ICCPR should be directly applied to Facebook’s 
content policies, which seems misplaced, there is more flexibility within the 
language of Article 19 than Facebook’s communication indicates.  Article 19 
allows restrictions on freedom of expression where necessary to protect 
private reputation or public order, health, and morals,204 which could 
encompass measures that limit the spread of especially harmful 
misinformation.  To avoid violating international law, the restrictions must be 
specific, genuinely necessary, and proportional to the interest at stake.205  That 
language could, for example, allow a social media company to de-emphasize, 
flag, and fact-check content known to be verifiably false – which seems to be 
Facebook’s actual practice.206  Furthermore, while it is worrisome when states 
enact laws targeting “fake news,”207  Facebook is not a state actor.208  Social 
media companies like Facebook can and should go beyond what states can do 
 
 201. 999 U.N.T.S. 171.  
 202. Allen, supra note 197.  
 203. Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 
651, 676 (2017).  
 204. Art. 19(3)(b), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 205. U.N. Human Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression 
et al., supra note 200, at 3. 
 206. See, e.g., Community Standards: Integrity and Authenticity: 21, False 
News, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/integrity_authenticity 
[https://perma.cc/G9XJ-5T2A] (last visited June 1, 2020); id. at 22. Manipulated 
Media (“[W]e will continue to invest in partnerships (including with journalists, 
academics and independent fact-checkers) to help us reduce the distribution of 
false news and misinformation.”).  
 207. David Kaye, Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (Apr. 3, 2018) 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/OL_MYS_03.04.
18.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LFQ-VY5M] (arguing that proposed speech limitations 
in the bill before the Malaysian Parliament exceeded the exception allowed in 
ICCPR Art. 19(3)(b)). 
 208. But see Jed Rubenfeld, Are Facebook and Google State Actors?, 
LAWFARE (Nov. 4, 2019, 8:20AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/are-facebook-
and-google-state-actors [https://perma.cc/5GUG-KMC8]. 
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in managing information flows on their platforms, analogous to self-
regulation by journalists and publishers in legacy media, precisely because the 
human rights obligations of states prevent most government regulation in this 
area.209  
Facebook has stated that within its free expression legal framework, false 
statements of fact are protected and allowed: “Human rights law extends the 
same right to expression to those who wish to claim the world is flat as those 
who state that it is round—and so does Facebook.  It may be the case that false 
content breaks our rules—but not always.”210  That false statements are 
“protected” does not mean that Facebook does not discriminate between 
content containing verifiably false claims and all others.  “False news,” for 
example, is “show[n] lower in the News Feed,” which “significantly reduce[s] 
its distribution.”211  Facebook clarifies that it refrains from outright 
“remov[ing] false news” solely for being false.212   
Some scholars have argued that drowning out or burying content on 
social media is the functional equivalent of censorship.213  This observation 
complicates how one thinks about many of the misinformation governance 
proposals discussed in the literature.  They are, if we accept this functional 
account, algorithmically determined censorship regimes overseen by private 
corporations – a dystopian development.  While users are still free to post and 
share whatever they wish, assuming it does not violate the site’s content 
standards, unseen, “black box” mechanisms decide how many other users will 
see them, controlled by private entities with few methods of accountability.214  
A functional account of censorship accordingly raises grave concerns about 
the practical ability of people to exercise free speech.   
One response to the functional censorship concern is that such content 
decisions made by large media companies are not categorically new.  News 
editors have always decided which stories to run and, if so, how prominently 
to place them.215  Much of the present-day panic over misinformation can be 
understood as arising from the loss of these traditional gatekeepers over 
 
 209. ARTICLE 19, SELF-REGULATION AND ‘HATE SPEECH’ ON SOCIAL MEDIA 




 210. Allen, supra note 197.  
 211. FACEBOOK, supra note 206, at 21. 
 212. Id.  
 213. See, e.g., Tim Wu, supra note 123, at 566; Syed, supra note 97, at 355 
(describing tactics by governments and their proxies to flood social media 
networks with false or distracting speech to overwhelm undesired content).  
 214. Taina Bucher, Want to Be on the Top? Algorithmic Power and the Threat 
of Invisibility on Facebook, 14 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1164, 1167–69 (2012) 
(describing how Facebook’s algorithms structure what is seen on users’ News 
Feeds in ways that are unknown to outside observers).  
 215. Volokh & Falk, supra note 180, at 887–89.  
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objective facts.  In this light, the drive for “reduced distribution” content-
controls online is a demand that design choices for social media algorithms 
reflect a larger set of values than solely user-engagement and profit – an 
ethical obligation, analogous to the expectations of fairness, integrity, and 
civic-mindedness placed on legacy media outlets.  For social media platforms, 
these editorial values would be enacted, in part, by deciding which stories are 
worth amplifying and which are not.  
The need for effective governance of misinformation, while respecting 
free expression rights, militates toward accepting this rebuttal.  But this 
counterargument does not, on its own, provide a satisfying response to civil 
liberty concerns on functional censorship from powerful private entities.  
Perhaps the best method to reconcile these conflicting values would be more 
transparency in how algorithm design choices are made, the impacts of those 
decisions, and their enforcement, namely by allowing researchers, regulators, 
and users to access and inspect company algorithms and policies to the 
greatest practicable extent.  For example, Facebook’s published community 
standards are not the whole of its entire content policy.  In order to facilitate 
regimented, consistent, and cheap case-by-case implementation of its 
standards, Facebook has developed a voluminous and precise body of internal 
rules for content review.216  The rank-and-file content moderators typically 
work in call center atmospheres, rigidly applying these rules to thousands of 
pieces of user- and algorithm-flagged content a week.217  Academic analyses 
of these internal codes rely on information leaks by company insiders,218 a 
situation that is far from optimal.  Making more of these content-moderation 
codes public would go far in notifying information consumers as to how 
Facebook actually enforces its policies, as well as informing expert and 
community feedback to improve those codes.  
4.  Moderating Patently False Conspiracy Theory Content on 
Facebook 
One of Facebook’s community standards appears to prohibit content that 
promotes conspiracy theories denying the reality of certain tragic events:  
Do not . . . [t]arget anyone maliciously by . . . [p]osting content about 
a violent tragedy, or victims of violent tragedies that include claims 
that a violent tragedy did not occur [or] with claims that they are . . . 
[a]cting/pretending to be a victim of an event [or] otherwise paid or 
employed to mislead people about their role in the event.219   
 
 216. Klonick, supra note 19, at 1641–42.  
 217. Id. at 1640. 
 218. E.g. id. at 1644 n.319. 
 219. Community Standards: Safety: 9. Bullying and Harassment, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/safety 
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Though Facebook does not use the phrase “conspiracy theory,” it is clear 
by the language “otherwise paid or employed” that such content is what the 
rule proscribes – baseless assertions that an unknown third-party is secretly 
employing crisis actors in attempt to mislead the public.  This rule seems to 
have provided the basis for banning Alex Jones from the site for promoting 
false conspiracy theories that Sandy Hook was a hoax.220  Arguably, 
Holocaust denialism would also be covered by the text of this rule, though 
past statements made by Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg indicate not.221  
Facebook ultimately banned Holocaust conspiracy theories under a different 
rule, prohibiting hate speech.222   
In any case, there is company precedent for outright banning content that 
spreads harmful and patently false conspiracy theories, so long as the content 
“maliciously” targets a specific person or group of people.  This has 
significance for chemtrail misinformation, insofar as conspiracy theory 
content targets a specific scientist or group of scientists.  Some solar 
geoengineering researchers already report that chemtrail content interferes 
with their work and their efforts to communicate its significance to the 
public.223 
 
[https://perma.cc/9BKW-HYXJ] (last visited October 31, 2020) (emphasis 
added).  
 220. Cristiano Lima, Facebook Wades Deeper into Censorship Debate As It 
Bans ‘Dangerous’ Accounts, POLITICO (May 2, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/02/facebook-bans-far-right-alex-jones-
1299247 [https://perma.cc/R2B8-4CAX]. 
 221. See Karen Zraick, Mark Zuckerberg Seeks to Clarify Remarks about 
Holocaust Deniers after Outcry, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 18, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18/technology/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-
holocaust-denial.html [https://perma.cc/8494-K4XJ] (reporting Facebook 
founder Zuckerberg’s distinction between conspiracy-theory content harassing 
Sandy Hook survivors, which is banned, and conspiracy-theory content denying 
the Holocaust, which was not at the time). 
 222. Monika Bickert, Removing Holocaust Denial Content, FACEBOOK (Oct. 
12, 2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/10/removing-holocaust-denial-
content/; see also Community Standards: Objectionable Content: 12. Hate 
Speech, FACEBOOK https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/hate_speech 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2020). Internal guidance leaked in 2012 revealed that 
Facebook required content moderators to automatically escalate Holocaust denial 
content to more experienced content moderators, suggesting the applicable rule 
was nuanced even then. See oDesk, Abuse Standards 6.1: Operation Manual for 
Live Content Moderators at 14, 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/81863464/oDeskStandards [https://perma.cc/P6ZV-
V9ZA] (cited in Klonick, supra note 19, at 1644 n.319). 
 223. James Temple, How One Climate Scientist Combats Threats and 
Misinformation from Chemtrail Conspiracists, MIT TECH. REV. (Jul. 26, 2018), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/07/26/240379/how-one-climate-
scientist-combats-threats-and-misinformation-from-chemtrail-conspiracists/ 
[https://perma.cc/H5CB-DKMN] (reports researcher David Keith: “For us, it’s 
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5. Paths Not Taken: Stricter Content Controls Abroad 
Governments willing to threaten social media companies can wield 
significant influence over their content moderation policies – free speech 
commitments of Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter notwithstanding.  The 
influence of those countries is obviously greatest over the media markets 
within their jurisdictions, but sometimes Internet regulatory practices 
developed in one country can seep into others.224   
The European Union, for example, has taken a stronger regulatory 
approach than the United States to misinformation cascades on social 
media.225  The European Commission has created a Code of Practice on 
Disinformation (“Code”), which defines disinformation, sets forth principles 
for its management, and establishes commitments by online platforms to 
sanction accounts and content creators that disseminate disinformation.226  
Social media platforms agreeing to the Code pledge to be more transparent in 
advertising, “dilute the visibility of disinformation,” implement user-facing 
fact-checking tools, and share data with researchers.227  They also agree to 
invest in technologies, programs, and tools to meet these objectives, as well 
as to publicly report progress in meeting these goals.228  Google, Facebook, 
Twitter, and Microsoft consented to the Code,229 but reportedly out of fear of 
“more heavy-handed legislation.”230 
While Facebook asserts that its content policies are universal,231 the 
company often hires rank-and-file content moderators who live in the same 
country as the user base being moderated.  Facebook does so because content 
 
definitely already causing us some trouble, in the sense that we’ve taken time and 
even money to talk to Harvard security people and think about physical security 
measures for us. And I think it is making some people nervous about working on 
this topic, because they’re worried about physical security. I think we’ll have to 
take extra time to think about physical security when we do the experiment or 
have meetings.”). 
 224. See Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data 
Privacy Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 115, 165–170 (2017) (describing the diplomatic, 
security, and market incentives that lead to “convergence” in data privacy 
practices in Europe and the United States). 
 225. See Nunziato, supra note 161, at 1531–38. 
 226. EUR. COMM’N, CODE OF PRACTICE ON DISINFORMATION (Sep. 26, 2018).  
 227. Id. at Part I, viii–x.  
 228. Id. at Parts II.D, III (16). 
 229. Nunziato, supra note 161, at 1532.  
 230. Foo Yun Chee, Facebook, Google to tackle spread of fake news, advisors 
want more, REUTERS (Sep. 26, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-
tech-fakenews/facebook-google-to-tackle-spread-of-fake-news-advisors-want-
more-idUSKCN1M61AG [https://perma.cc/K2X6-GJQQ]. 
 231. Community Standards: Introduction, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/introduction 
[https://perma.cc/24FA-N8J3] (last visited June 1, 2020). 
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moderation often requires familiarity with the language and cultural contexts 
of the speech governed.232  This implies that jurisdiction-tailored 
implementation of the universal standards is important to the company.  
YouTube similarly states that its content standards apply to all user-posted 
material on their site.233  Exceptions are made, however.  In late 2006, for 
example, YouTube, acting on behalf of the Thai monarchy, removed videos 
from its platform that mocked the king from streaming within Thailand.  One 
of Google’s top lawyers at the time framed the decision as a moment of 
cultural sensitivity and humility by the company.234  The decision was also 
likely influenced by the monarchy’s threat “to block YouTube to anyone using 
a Thai IP address,”235 cutting the company off from a valuable media market. 
Stricter content requirements created for one jurisdiction may spill over 
into content moderation policies in less restrictive jurisdictions..236  The extent 
of inter-jurisdictional spillover is hard to demonstrate because social media 
companies share little of their internal thinking about platform design and 
content moderation policies.  But there are some examples.  For instance, 
leaked internal guidance from Facebook instructs first-response content 
moderators to always escalate certain content politically sensitive in Turkey 
to higher-level review.  Flagged content includes images  depicting a burning 
Turkish flag or maps of Kurdistan or otherwise mocking Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey.237  It is unclear from the document 
whether that rule applies universally, but there is reason to think it might. The 
Turkish government temporarily blocked YouTube in Turkey after Google 
refused to globally ban videos that mocked Atatürk.238  It seems not to have 
blocked Facebook at the time over this particular issue.  
Readers may note the preceding analysis is speculative, relying on 
inference, rumors covered in the press, and leaked documents stripped of their 
institutional context.  This fact-sourcing problem arises from one of the major 
challenges of misinformation governance.  The entities best situated to gather 
data, the platforms, rarely share this information with the wider research 
community and are seldom forthcoming about their policy decisions and 
moderation infrastructure.239  Until that situation changes, outside observers 
must rely a great deal on speculation and unverifiable factual assertions – an 
 
 232. Newton, supra note 127.  
 233. See Policies, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/about/policies/#community-guidelines 
[https://perma.cc/T6WW-7FWT] (last visited June 1, 2020). 
 234. Klonick, supra note 19, at 1623. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Nunziato, supra note 161, at 1532. 
 237. oDesk, supra note 222, at 14; see also Klonick, supra note 19, at 1644 
n.319. 
 238. Klonick, supra note 19, at 1624 (citing Jeffrey Rosen, Google’s 
Gatekeepers, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 28, 2008)).   
 239. See, e.g., id. at 1644 n.319. 
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ironic turn for a field seeking to limit the spread of misinformation from 
unreliable or unverifiable sources.  
IV. PROPOSED METHODS OF CHEMTRAIL MISINFORMATION 
GOVERNANCE 
This Part considers different methods that could be used to limit the 
spread and influence of chemtrail misinformation online.  Some methods 
respond directly to chemtrail conspiracy theory content, with the hope of 
affording people better access to quality information on solar geoengineering.  
Others take a wider look at the structural factors that enable the spread of 
misinformation as a whole.  Some responses could be implemented quickly, 
but the strategies most likely to have the greatest impact would require more 
resources and time, especially information literacy education.  A few methods 
that should be avoided are also considered, explaining why the risk of backfire 
or severe collateral damage outweighs potential benefits.  
A.  Direct Responses to Chemtrail Misinformation 
A few measures can directly counter chemtrail content with minimal risk 
of backfiring.  First, opening up governance processes regarding solar 
geoengineering research could help alleviate the feelings of exclusion and 
powerlessness that feed conspiracy theories.  Second, direct petitioning of 
social media platforms could nudge them toward limiting the spread of 
harmful information on their websites.  Third, a more organized public 
communications campaign by solar geoengineering research advocates would 
provide a focused counternarrative to the chemtrailer worldview.  Finally, 
defamation actions may be available for individuals targeted by maliciously 
false information.  
1.  Inclusive Administrative Procedures for Solar Geoengineering 
Decision-Making 
Chemtrail misinformation thrives on feelings of exclusion from control 
over issues of vital public concern.240  Opening such decision-making 
procedures up to the public to the widest extent possible could do much to 
strike at the emotional core of the chemtrail narrative.  There are a few legal 
instruments that could be of use in the case of a federal agency researching 
solar geoengineering.  For example, environmental review under the National 
Environmental Policy Act can provide substantial opportunities for public 
participation, hearings, and airing of concerns, so long as the agency is willing 
to entertain expansive deliberative process.241  The public comment process 
 
 240. See Bakalaki, supra 32, at 13. 
 241. James W. Spensley, National Environmental Policy Act, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 681, 695–97 (Thomas F. P. Sullivan ed., 
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on environmental review analysis also obligates the agency to thoughtfully 
respond to those critiques, creating a record of the public’s concerns.242  
Maximizing the potential of these administrative processes would require 
significantly more outreach and publicization than agency decision-making 
usually receives regarding research programs.  There are also limits: a more 
deliberative administrative process would not create democratic control over 
administrative outcomes, beside presidential elections.  But more inclusive 
administrative processes would help facilitate better informed stakeholders 
and help keep decisionmakers attuned to the concerns of those groups.  
Potential participation by chemtrailers in these processes raises little 
reason for concern.  Reports of encounters between chemtrailers and scientific 
experts describe the events as civil and occasionally productive.243  
Furthermore, because chemtrailers theories rely on flimsy evidence, experts 
and public officials present can quickly counter and debunk them, likely 
limiting the spread of the belief to other participants.  Some conspiracy theory 
communities encourage violence against supposed perpetrators of the 
conspiracy, but the chemtrail community is not one of them 244 
2.  Direct Petitioning of Platforms to Control Chemtrail Content 
The simplest governance method would be to identify problem areas of 
misinformation online and bring them to the attention of the platforms in an 
authoritative, conspicuous, and persuasive manner.  Something similar may 
have already occurred with YouTube and chemtrail misinformation.  
Anecdotally speaking, in February 2019, a search of “geoengineering” on 
YouTube and Twitter returned almost exclusively chemtrail conspiracy 
misinformation.245    This experience was confirmed by empirical research of 
YouTube’s search engine, published later in 2019, reporting the same 
phenomenon.246  But while researching in November 2020, searching 
 
2019); see also Charles R. Corbett, “Extraordinary” and “Highly 
Controversial”: Federal Research of Solar Geoengineering Under NEPA, 115 
NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE ___ (forthcoming 2021). 
 242. Id. at 702 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4); see also Update to the Regulations 
Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy 
Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 1722 (Jan. 10, 2020) (proposed revisions to CEQ’s 
implementing regulations for NEPA containing the same obligation cited in 
present regulations). 
 243. See, e.g., Temple, supra note 223; Morton, supra note 29, at 104. 
 244. Cf., e.g., Matthew Haag & Maya Salam, Gunman in ‘Pizzagate’ Shooting 
Is Sentenced to 4 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 22, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/22/us/pizzagate-attack-sentence.html 
[https://perma.cc/N5W9-2MR5]. 
 245. Without more open sharing of algorithm information by social media 
companies, it is difficult to gather more than anecdotal evidence on search returns. 
See supra Part III.C.5.  
 246. Allgaier, supra note 15, at 1.  
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“geoengineering” on YouTube returned only high-quality informational 
videos on the first page (both for and against scientifically researching 
stratospheric aerosol injection proposals).  Directly searching “chemtrails” 
returned debunking content, as it also did on Google’s search engine.  It seems 
that YouTube has made good on recent promises to limit user exposure to 
conspiracy theory content.247   
Searching “geoengineering” on Twitter, however, still returns a large 
amount of chemtrail conspiracy theory content.  Twitter is considered more 
resistant to content restrictions than its peer social media websites,248 but the 
company has changed its content policies in the past in response to substantial 
public pressure.249  Petitioning Twitter to respond to especially odious 
categories of misinformation could be sufficiently popular to repeat the 
success of previous campaigns.  
3.  High-Quality Accessible Content on Solar Geoengineering 
Research 
Another approach would be to create more high-quality content on solar 
geoengineering designed for lay audiences.  Counterspeech may be of limited 
use, but it still has the potential to inform viewers and dispel baseless 
concerns.250  There is a question, though, of which groups should go about 
producing such content.  It may be the case that only a group dedicated to 
advocating for scientific research on solar geoengineering would have 
sufficient capacity and institutional focus to create informative and engaging 
content over a sustained period.  Such a public communications outfit may 
already be necessary, though, given the emergence of a federal initiative for 
climate research on stratospheric aerosols.251  Alternatives could include 
partnerships with popular producers of online entertainment-education  to 
create videos on solar geoengineering research. Kurzegesagt, a YouTube 
channel with over 13 million subscribers, in fact released an infotainment 
video on geoengineering in October 2020 and may be interested in producing 
 
 247. See Casey Newton, YouTube Says It Will Recommend Fewer Videos 
about Conspiracy Theories, THE VERGE (Jan. 25, 2019). 
 248. See, e.g., Issie Lapowsky, Twitter Finally Axes Alex Jones–Over a 
Publicity Stunt, WIRED (Sep. 6, 2018) (reporting Twitter deplatformed right-wing 
conspiracy theorist Alex Jones only after “Facebook, Apple, YouTube, Spotify, 
and other tech giants” banned him). 
 249. Klonick, supra note 19, at 1629 (responding to outcry over coordinated 
harassment by users during GamerGate). 
 250. Cf. Christine Shearer et al., Quantifying Expert Consensus Against the 
Existence of a Secret, Large-Scale Atmospheric Spraying Program, 11 ENVTL. 
RES. LETTERS no. 084011 at 8 (2016) (providing an authoritative research 
document to debunk chemtrail conspiracy theories).  
 251. See Emily Pontecorvo, The Climate Policy Milestone That Was Buried in 
the 2020 Budget, GRIST (Jan. 8, 2020). 
44
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss3/5
2020] GOVERNING CONSPIRACY THEORY MISINFORMATION 677 
follow-up content.252  This YouTube channel and others have experience in 
distilling complex scientific topics into digestible, visually appealing short 
videos, and they have built large audiences for their work.253  They would 
make good partners for communicating developments in solar geoengineering 
research to a wider audience. 
4.  Tort Actions for Speech-Based Harms 
There are signs that federal courts are becoming more receptive to 
defamation lawsuits and other causes of action for speech-based harms arising 
factually false news coverage.254  The potential trend reflects “more judges 
embracing the notion that major news outlets are partisan combatants,” not 
objective reporters.255  For example, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit recently held that a lawsuit could proceed against Fox 
News and two of its reporters, alleging malicious investigation and reporting 
on the murder of Seth Rich.256  Rich, a Democratic National Committee 
(“DNC”) employee, was shot to death in 2016, in Washington, D.C., during a 
botched robbery.257  Conspiracy theorists baselessly speculate that Rich was 
murdered under orders of the then-presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, and 
her husband, Bill Clinton, in retaliation for the 2016 DNC email leak.258  The 
complaint, brought by Rich’s parents, alleged Fox News reporters had 
 
 252. Kurzgesagt, Geoengineering, A Horrible Idea We Might Have to Do, 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 27,2020) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dSu5sXmsur4.,;  
 253. Kurzgesagt, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/user/Kurzgesagt/about (last visited Nov. 1, 2020) 
(reporting over 1.1 billion video views); CrashCourse, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/user/crashcourse/about (last visited Nov. 3, 2020) 
(reporting 11.5 million subscribers and over 1.3 billion views). 
 254. See Josh Gerstein, Media’s Legal Defeats Trouble First Amendment 
Advocates, POLITICO (Sep. 23, 2019).  
 255. Id.  Gerstein cites three separate rulings against media companies: (1) 
Butowsky v. Folkenfilk, No. 4:18cv442, 2019 WL 3712026, at *2–3 (E.D. Tex. 
Aug. 7, 2019) (alleging a conspiracy between National Public Radio and others 
in coverage connecting businessman Butowsky to the spread of conspiracy 
theories about the murder of Seth Rich); (2) Palin v. New York Times Co., 940 
F.3d 804, 807–08, 813–15 (2d Cir. 2019) (defamation action brought by former 
vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin, arising out of an editorial connecting a 
map released by Palin’s political action committee to the attempted assassination 
of congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords); and (3) Rich v. Fox News Network, LLC, 
939 F.3d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 2019) (discussed below).  Empirical analysis would be 
needed to determine whether these three cases are, indeed, part of a larger trend. 
 256. Rich, 939 F.3d at 122–130 (alleging intentional inflection of emotional 
distress and tortious interference with contract by the reporters, as well as 
negligent supervision by Fox). 
 257. Id. at 117. 
 258. Id. at 117 n.3. 
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harassed the Rich family and promoted baseless conspiracy theories about 
Rich’s death on cable news, causing them great emotional harm.259  The 
Second Circuit panel unanimously found that the pleadings cleared the “actual 
malice” requirement for public figures bringing suit for defamation or 
intentional inflection of emotional distress – historically, a very high bar even 
at the pleadings stage.260  
Some argue that lowering such barriers to defamation suits would be 
good, especially in the context of weaponized defamation via false news 
reports and coordinated harassment campaigns.261  But lowering the bar to 
defamation suits could significantly harm freedom of the press for the sake of 
a few private reputations, specifically, those reputations with enough 
resources to bring suit.  As solar geoengineering research continues to 
develop, however, it is likely that outrageous, false, and damaging claims will 
be made by chemtrail conspiracy theorists against specific researchers, 
scientists, or policymakers.  A defamation lawsuit may be the least bad option 
in those circumstances.262  An intriguing side effect would be a court’s on-
the-record inquiry into the plausibility of chemtrail conspiracy theories 
allegations, serving as an  opportunity to debunk these baseless ideas in the 
 
 259. Id. at 118–19.  
 260. Id. at 126.  More recently, Fox News has come under fire for spreading 
misinformation about the coronavirus pandemic on some of its television news 
programs.  See, e.g., Todd Gitlin et al., Rupert Murdoch, Fox News’ Covid-19 
Misinformation Is a Danger to Public Health, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 9, 2020) 
(open letter by nearly 200 hundred U.S. journalists and teachers of journalism). 
 Early research indicates conspiracy theory misinformation on Fox News’s 
Hannity led to worse social-distancing compliance among its viewers and thus 
greater incidence of COVID-19.  See Leonardo Bursztyn et al., Misinformation 
During a Pandemic 1–2 (Becker Friedman Inst. for Econ, U. Chi., Working Paper 
No. 2020-44) https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/BFI_WP_202044.pdf 
(comparing compliance and infection rates to viewers of Fox’s Tucker Carlson 
Tonight, which provided more accurate coverage).  
  
 261. See McKee v. Cosby, 139 S.Ct. 675, 682 (2019) (mem.) (Thomas, J.) 
(concurring in denial of cert.) (calling for a reconsideration of New York Times, 
Co. v. Sullivan’s “actual malice” standard for defamation suits).  
 262. Depending on their prominence, certain geoengineering researchers or 
academics could be required to show “actual malice” at the pleadings stage in 
defamation actions.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345, 351 
(1974) (explaining that some people have reduced protection from defamatory 
speech because they have “thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public 
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved,” thereby 
“invit[ing] attention and comment”).  Gertz, as it happens, concerned reporting by 
the John Birch Society falsely claiming the lawyer Elmer Gertz was part of a vast 
communist conspiracy seeking to overthrow the U.S. government. Id. at 325; cf. 
Hofstadter, supra note 121, at 80. 
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eyes of people receptive to court authority on fact-finding.263  For example, a 
federal court in Canada recently refused to admit evidence presented in 
support of a lawsuit alleging a covert chemtrail program carried out by the 
Canadian government, concluding that the expert affidavit was poorly 
reasoned.264  
B.  Broader Responses to Online Misinformation 
Chemtrail misinformation is symptomatic of larger trends in online 
misinformation, meaning a more comprehensive response should target those 
underlying causes.  Information literacy education could help equip ordinary 
people with better tools to make sense of the online media landscape for 
themselves.  Better policies by social media companies would allow outside 
researchers to analyze the way information flows on their platforms, 
potentially leading to better ideas for misinformation management.  Finally, 
an informal “public trustee agreement” between social media companies and 
public advocates could help foster a greater sense of responsibility among 
platforms for the information needs of their users. 
1.  Information Literacy Initiatives 
The sudden deluge of misinformation is somewhat reminiscent of the 
explosion of consumer-chemical products in the 1940s and 1950s,  exposing 
Americans to countless unfamiliar chemical compounds in cleaning solvents, 
hygiene products, and pharmaceuticals.265  Public education efforts developed 
in the mid-twentieth century to inform consumers of the health risks of 
ingesting these chemicals, an initiative which, eventually, matured into Poison 
Control.266  Perhaps one day Snopes will be the Poison Control for 
misinformation, helping Internet users distinguish reliable stories from 
hoaxes.267  A problem with this analogy, though, is that mid-twentieth century 
Americans seemed more willing to trust something like Poison Control as an 
authoritative institution.  
 
 263. See Tracy Hester, “Liability and Compensation,” CLIMATE ENGINEERING 
AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 239–40. 
 264. Pelletier v. Her Majesty the Queen, [2018] F.C. 805, *7–8 (Can.). 
 265. Poison Control, on Radiolab, (WNYC Studios 2018) 
https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolab/articles/poison-control 
[https://perma.cc/4QVA-ARZQ] (describing the efforts of Dr. Edward Press and 
others “in creating a formalized poison control system in Chicago in the early 
1950s”). 
 266. Robert G. Scherz & William O. Robertson, The History of Poison Control 
Centers in the United States, 12 CLINICAL TOXICOLOGY, 291, 292 (1978). 
 267. See SNOPES, https://www.snopes.com/about-snopes/ 
[https://perma.cc/4ZJ6-X7XU] (last visited May 1, 2020) (Snopes is “the oldest 
and largest fact-checking site online, widely regarded by journalists, folklorists, 
and readers as an invaluable research companion.”). 
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Given the fragmentation of trust and the ease of access to conflicting 
factual assertions, it is critical to improve community resilience to weak 
factual claims.  That resilience is called “information literacy,”268 and it 
describes an attitude of skepticism toward unfamiliar factual claims; a 
sensitivity to bias in reporting; and a set of analytical tools to assess a source’s 
trustworthiness.269  It is a mindset and a toolkit to assist in weighing 
information, though it is not necessarily the ability to determine whether a 
statement is true or false.270  The end goal of information literacy could 
therefore be described as sophistication enabling an informed sense of trust.   
An information literacy campaign could consist of short-term and long-
term education goals.  In the short-term, public awareness campaigns could 
urge caution against potentially deceptive claims.  Easily sharable 
informational content, like the infographic How to Spot Fake News, is one 
example: it reminds the reader of basic source-checking steps, like looking up 
the author and publisher or checking the date of the article.271  The infographic 
may be too thorough, though.  It would benefit from simplifying its message 
to a simple, memorable slogan in the spirit of “stop, drop, and roll,” or “if you 
see something, say something.”  Libraries have produced learning tools like 
the “CRAAP Test” and the “RADAR” method assessing source credibility,272 
but, again, both tools consist of checklists that are too cumbersome to be used 
regularly in day-to-day life.273  A better public education campaign is needed 
that gets across the basic idea of caution.   
Skepticism can play only a limited role in the resilience of Internet users.  
While a skeptical attitude is critical to resisting shaky factual claims, online 
information consumers appear to be overly skeptical of reliable new 
sources.274  Trust is therefore essential to developing a socially optimal mode 
 
 268. EUR. COMM’N, supra note 87, at 2; Darrel M. West, How to Combat Fake 
News and Disinformation, BROOKINGS (Dec. 18, 2017) (advocating for reader and 
viewer skepticism); FACEBOOK, supra note 196 (calling for “promoting news 
literacy”).  
 269. Facts and Trust in a Post-Truth World, supra note 125 (interview with 
Rachel Buchanan).  
 270. Id. 
 271. INT’L FED. LIBR. ASS’NS & INSTS., How to Spot Fake News (digital 
image) (last updated Jan. 8, 2020) https://www.ifla.org/publications/node/11174.  
 272. MILNER LIBR., ILL. STATE U., CRAAP Test Worksheet, 
https://guides.library.illinoisstate.edu/ld.php?content_id=14672390, (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2020) (Currency, Relevance, Authority, Accuracy, and Purpose); Jane 
Mandalios RADAR: An Approach for Helping Students Evaluate Internet Sources, 
39 J. INFO. SCI. 470 (2013) (Relevance, Authority, Date, Appearance, and Reason 
for writing). 
 273. Mathew C. Sullivan, Libraries and Fake News: What’s the Problem? 
What’s the Plan?, 13 COMMS. INFO. LITERACY 91, 101 (2019) 
 274. Gordon Pennycook & David G. Rand, Fighting Misinformation on Social 
Media Using Crowdsourced Judgments of New Source Quality, 116 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 2521, 2525 (2019) (reporting that survey subjects underrated the 
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of skepticism.  Perhaps an information literacy program would begin early in 
students’ lives, growing more sophisticated as they progress through their 
education.275  It’s worth noting that building an analytical skillset to facilitate 
informed trust would be difficult and would likely have unpredictable results.  
By definition, such a program could only give communities the ability to 
fluently navigate and assess information streams; what learners do with those 
tools would be left up to them.  Nonetheless, when taking the democratic long 
view on the misinformation problem, such education programs seem 
necessary.  Communities will adjust, one way or another, to the deluge of 
information online, and it would be foolish for educators not to assist with this 
transition.  
2.  Safe Harbor for Research 
How social media shapes public discourse is poorly understood by 
researchers276 and social media companies themselves.277  In the case of 
Facebook, the lack of information is partly due to the platform’s terms of 
service, which limit “automated collection of public information” and prohibit 
“the creation of temporary research accounts,” both of which are necessary 
for researchers and journalists to better understand how the website works.278  
The Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University publicly called 
upon Facebook to modify its policies to allow this important research, 
including proposed revisions to its terms of use to allow for such research 
activities while addressing privacy concerns and other issues.279  Climate 
researchers of all stripes, including geoengineering academics, could join in 
efforts to nudge social media platforms toward modifying their terms of 
service in this regard.  There are obvious reasons for company pushback: 
desire to avoid embarrassment, trade secret concerns, and obligations to 
protect user information.  Facebook, however, has stated in its content policies 
its commitment to “[c]ollaborating with academics and other organizations to 
help solve [the issue of false news],”280 which could give advocates some 
leverage.  Perhaps framing the request in terms of promises made and broken, 
rather than pointing only to the need for research, would give additional 
persuasive force.  
 
reliability of prominent news sources compared to the assessments of professional 
fact checkers).  
 275. JOANNA M. BURKHARDT, COMBATTING FAKE NEWS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
29 (2018). 
 276. See Sullivan, supra note 276, at 105 (calling for interdisciplinary research 
to better understand and respond to the problem of misinformation).  
 277. Letter from Jaffer et al., supra note 136, at 1.  
 278. Id. at 2.  
 279. Id.   
 280. FACEBOOK, supra note 196.  
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3.  Public Trustee Agreement 
Social media companies have repeatedly stated their commitment to free 
speech and enacted policies to facilitate the free expression rights of speakers.  
What is needed, however, are additional commitments to the needs of 
listeners.281  A non-binding agreement between big technology companies and 
public stakeholders could recognize the responsibilities that come with the 
influence they wield over the content flows on their networks.  Information 
consumers rely on social media companies to direct their attention to 
informative, entertaining, and worthwhile content, and filter out the 
uninteresting and unhelpful.  The technologies that structure users’ online 
attention should be guided by not only “engagement,” but also concern for the 
quality of the information being shared.  If social media companies are to 
receive the legal protections of newspaper editors, if not higher, they should 
be expected to take on the traditional, norms-based responsibilities that come 
with the editorial role.  
A public trustee agreement could, among other things: (1) recognize the 
connection between information consumption and democratic processes; (2) 
name social media companies’ roles as “public trustees” over the information 
exchange at the heart of the public discourse;282 (3) assert a commitment to 
building healthy information exchanges on their websites; and (4) allow users 
to understand why they are being shown certain content.283  Much of this 
agreement would recognize commitments made by social media companies 
within Europe and quasi-formally import them to the United States.  The 
agreement could be joined by a wide range of prominent civic organizations, 
universities, and media companies.  While it would not include government 
entities, it should include political advocacy groups so as to increase 
legitimacy across the political spectrum.  
There are a few advantages to a non-binding agreement.  First 
Amendment doctrine prevents most content-based government regulation of 
private speech.  It is therefore unlikely that Congress could create a mandate, 
 
 281. See Wu, supra note 123, at 569 (advocating for inclusion of listener 
interests within First Amendment doctrine).  
 282. Cf. id. at 577 (examining and then rejecting a “public trustee” concept for 
platforms resembling the fairness doctrine that once governed the content 
decisions of radio and television broadcasters); see also Jack M. Balkin, 
Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1183, 
1205–09 (2016) (arguing the relationship between social media user and platform 
owner giving rise to certain fiduciary duties akin to those owed by “doctors, 
lawyers, and accountants”).  Balkin’s model describes the obligations of 
trustworthiness, loyalty, good faith, and care arising out of the power social media 
platforms have over their users, as well as the societal need for the companies’ 
services, with regard to personal data management. 
 283. See EUR. COMM’N, supra note 226, at part I(iii) (social media companies 
pledging to “enable users to understand why they have been targeted by a given 
advertisement.”).  
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say within the Communications Decency Act, requiring a “fair, reliable, and 
robust” exchange of ideas on large social media platforms.284  A non-binding 
agreement, however, would not have to find its way through Congress and 
survive judicial review, nor would it provoke the same fears of thought control 
from Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.  The proposal draws on the workings of 
international law, where non-binding agreements can be powerful tools to 
enforce norms and encourage good behavior in the absence of an overarching 
government authority.285  While advocates should be wary of uncritically 
porting the principles of international law into an arena where they may not 
belong, this does seem to be a situation in which a non-binding agreement 
could help.   
There also is something to be said for the value of a range of interest 
groups, universities, and media companies declaring social media companies 
as public trustees, simply because of the power the companies possess, 
without the assent of the companies themselves.  Though there are many 
reasons why these companies would not want to agree, absent threat of state 
sanction,286 signing onto such an agreement could help restore their 
reputations.  
C.  Proposals to Avoid 
This Subpart argues that two widely discussed strategies for countering 
misinformation have drawbacks that would likely far outweigh their benefits.  
Targeted debunking campaigns of chemtrail conspiracy content could 
inadvertently draw attention to and spread chemtrail misinformation.  The 
better approach would be to continue communicating a clear, accessible, and 
prominent narrative on what solar geoengineering research actually is.  Paring 
back third-party liability protections under the Communications Decency Act, 
meanwhile, would severely harm the vigorous exchange of ideas online.  
Advocates should seek other forms of leverage over social media platforms to 
push them toward improving their content moderation practices.   
 
 284. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (striking down overly broad 
anti-indecency content requirements in the Communications Decency Act); see 
also Volokh & Falk, supra note 180, at 893 (“It is clearer still that the government 
may not demand that a search engine live up to some hypothetical and undefined 
expectations of abstract objectivity.”). 
 285. See also Stephen P. Mulligan, CONG. RES. SERV., International Law and 
Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law 12 (2018) (“such commitments may . . . 
carry significant moral and political weight”); see also Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 301, Reporters’ Notes 2, 
Nonbinding agreements (1987) (“the political inducements to comply with such 
agreements may be strong and the consequences of noncompliance may 
sometimes be serious.”). 
 286. See Foo Yun Chee, supra note 230.  
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1.  Targeted Counterspeech Campaigns to Debunk Chemtrail 
Conspiracy Theories 
It is doubtful that authoritative institutions can launch effective directed 
debunking campaigns against conspiracy communities.  First, singling out a 
conspiracy theory for debunking gives it publicity, which causes more people 
to be exposed to the problematic content.287  Second, being targeted by an 
authority figure is easily twisted into unfalsifiable evidence in support of the 
conspiracy: “They are suppressing us because we speak the truth.”  Third, 
belief in outlandish conspiracy theories arises from a feeling of distrust more 
than the strength of the theory’s supporting evidence.288  Debunking 
conspiracy theories through covert infiltration of conspiracy communities, as 
some have proposed,289 seems even worse since it proposes an elaborate, real 
conspiracy to debunk outlandish, baseless ones.290  The “cure” would realize 
many of the fears of the communities targeted.  Pro-research advocates of 
solar geoengineering absolutely should debunk misstatements describing the 
field, but they should avoid targeting individual conspiracy theory groups 
with those debunking materials.  
2.  Stripping Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 
Platform Liability  Protections 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act limits the liability of 
digital intermediaries like Facebook and YouTube for third-party statements 
posted on their platforms; the platforms also cannot be liable for good faith 
removal of “objectionable material” from their websites.291  Section 230 is of 
fundamental importance to the Internet as it exists today and the profit models 
of social media platforms.292  Without it, operating a website like Facebook 
or YouTube could prove too risky due to threat of litigation.  Because of 
Section 230’s value, it is a powerful source of leverage for federal lawmakers 
over big tech companies. 
 
 287. Wu, supra note 123, at 559.  
 288. See Jones, supra note 80, at 15; Cairns, supra note 20, at 80; Bakalaki, 
supra note 32, at 13.  
 289. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 114, at 227 (making the case for 
covert “cognitive infiltration”).  
 290. David Coady, Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule on Conspiracy 
Theories, 3 ARGUMENTA 299–300 (2018) (“There is a glaring pragmatic 
inconsistency . . . [in] assurances that governments rarely get away with secrecy 
in open societies like ours and . . . advocacy of government secrecy (and indeed 
deception).”). 
 at 9 (2017).  
 291. BRANNON, supra note 172, at 10–11 (citing 42 US.C. § 230(c), (f)). 
 292. Ammori, supra note 94, at 2264.  
52
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss3/5
2020] GOVERNING CONSPIRACY THEORY MISINFORMATION 685 
Admittedly, leverage is needed to bring social media companies to the 
table on content control, such as with the supposedly voluntary 
Disinformation Code, created by the European Commission and agreed to by 
Google, Facebook, and others out of fear of more intrusive regulation.293  It is 
important, though, not to lose sight of the problem at hand: the careless mass 
dissemination of patently false information to users ill-equipped to sift 
through floods of contradictory claims.  The liability shield created by Section 
230, by contrast, is widely recognized as a good idea and fundamental to the 
contemporary information economy.294  Threatening limitations on this 
immunity may therefore be seen as a bluff.  Perhaps concomitant 
responsibilities could be attached to this grant of immunity, though it is highly 
doubtful that a law establishing an obligation to limit “misinformation” or 
“objectively false” content could survive constitutional review.295  In any 
event, the Section 230 shield should stay in place – destroying it would be a 
drastic and self-defeating option.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
The legitimacy of solar geoengineering research depends, in part, upon 
a free and productive public debate of the proposal’s merits and results.  
Chemtrail content, however, blights public discourse by obscuring facts and 
amplifying mistrust of scientific experts.  Some may be tempted to write this 
problem off as unimportant.  But experience has shown that baseless 
conspiracy theories can take root, spread, and alter political landscapes when 
they give voice to widespread anxieties.296  Chemtrailer narratives speak 
concretely to solar geoengineering’s most worrisome aspect, namely, the 
planet’s climate controlled by an unaccountable elite.297  There is good reason, 
then, to believe the idea could spread as scientific research of solar 
geoengineering advances, with the consequence of distorting its politics.   
Considerations of solar geoengineering governance thus must be 
expanded to consider the mass-information structures that shape public 
deliberation.  Misinformation governance in turn must sharpen its focus and 
analyze separately the different types of popular false information for their 
social function, appeal, and impact.  The foregoing analysis suggests a few 
immediate measures to take, like more open cooperation between social media 
companies and outside researchers, or algorithmic design choices that limit 
amplification of chemtrail content. But the governance of both solar 
 
 293. Foo Yun Chee, supra note 230.   
 294. E.g., U.N. Human Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression et al., supra note 200, at 2 (stating as a general principle of the right 
to free expression under international law that digital “[i]ntermediaries should 
never be liable for any third party content relating to those services unless” certain 
conditions are met).  
 295. See Reno v. ACLU, 571 U.S. 844, 870–71 (1997). 
 296. See generally Hofstadter, supra note 121. 
 297. See generally Cairns, supra note 20. 
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geoengineering and misinformation are multi-generational projects.  It is 
critical to approach both problems with an eye on the centuries to come. 
Information literacy programs and more open governance processes could go 
far in combating the factors that spur belief in conspiracy theory 
misinformation.  But there will be no going back to the pre-online world, just 
as there will be no return from the Anthropocene.  
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